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Corporate governance incentives at too-big-to-fail financial firms deserve sys-
tematic examination. For industrial conglomerates that have grown too large to be 
efficient, internal and external corporate structural pressures push to resize the firm. 
External activists press the firm to restructure to raise its stock market value. Inside 
the firm, boards and managers see that the too-big firm can be more efficient and 
more profitable if restructured via spinoffs and sales. But a major corrective for 
industrial firm overexpansion fails to constrain large, too-big-to-fail financial firms 
when (1) the funding boost that the firm captures by being too-big-to-fail sufficiently 
lowers the firm’s financing costs and (2) a resized firm or the spun-off entities 
would lose that funding benefit. Propositions (1) and (2) have both been true and, 
consequently, a major retardant to industrial firm overexpansion has gone missing 
for large financial firms. The effect resembles that of a corporate poison pill, but one 
that disrupts the actions of both outsiders and insiders. 
 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 1420 
I. THE LONDON WHALE AND JPMORGAN’S $6 BILLION  
TRADING LOSS ....................................................................... 1424 
A. The Events and the Corporate Governance Failure ........................ 1424 
B. The Conventional Corporate Governance Wisdom ......................... 1426 
1. A Loss Well Within Shareholders’ Equity ......................... 1426 
 
† Professor, Harvard Law School. Thanks for comments go to Jesse Fried, Jeffrey Gordon, 
Gabrielle Hodgson, Howell Jackson, Kathryn Judge, Peter Mülbert, Thomas Noone, Holger 
Spamann, Jean-Charles Rochet, John Schoettle, David Skeel, Michael Tröge, Sherry Xie, and 
workshop participants at the Ecole Supérieure du Commerce de Paris Europe, the ETH–NYU 
Law School conference on capital markets, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and Stanford 
Business School. 
  
1420 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 162: 1419 
 
2.  Shareholder- and Board-Based Governance as Remedy ...... 1427 
II.  STRUCTURAL DEGRADATION DUE TO THE IMPACT OF  
TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL .................................................................. 1428 
A.  Too-Big-to-Fail as Poison Pill ..................................................... 1429 
B.  Too-Big-to-Fail as Breakup Protection .......................................... 1430 
C.  Too-Big-to-Fail as Stymieing the Managerial Divisional Buyout ...... 1430 
D. The Required Takeover Premium .................................................. 1431 
III.  THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL: DATA ............ 1432 
A.  The Data: Concept .................................................................... 1433 
B.  The Data ................................................................................. 1433 
IV.  THE EXTENDED SOCIAL COSTS .............................................. 1438 
A.  The Monopolist’s Rectangle ......................................................... 1439 
B.  The Subsidy as Analogous to the Monopolist’s Rectangle .................. 1440 
C.  The Degradation as Another Channel to Financial Crisis ................ 1443 
V.  FURTHER CORPORATE DEGRADATION ................................... 1444 
A.  The Subsidy as Debt Overhang .................................................... 1445 
B.  Competitive Failure and Marketwide Degradation ......................... 1446 
C.  Too-Big-to-Jail ......................................................................... 1447 
D.  How Remaining Corporate Governance Pressures Are Weak or  
Further Degrade the Too-Big-to-Fail Financial Firm ..................... 1448 
VI.  WHAT CAN BE DONE: COMMAND-AND-CONTROL VERSUS 
INCENTIVE-BASED POLICIES .................................................. 1449 
A.  Severe Command-and-Control: Mimicking the Takeover and 
Breakup Market ........................................................................ 1450 
B.  Mainstream Command-and-Control: More Equity,  
Restricted Activities ....................................................................1451 
C.  Aligning Incentives: Taxing Financial Firms’ Debt ......................... 1452 
VII. THE STRUCTURAL OUTLOOK FOR BIG FINANCE WITHOUT  
A TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL SUBSIDY ................................................. 1453 
A.  Reducing the Systemic Cost of Shareholder-Oriented Governance ..... 1453 
B.  The Instability of the Too-Big-to-Fail Subsidy ............................... 1454 
C.  The Dealmaking Impact of Successful Regulation ........................... 1457 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 1459 
APPENDIX ...................................................................................... 1461 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance controls help to keep firms competitive and effi-
cient. They work imperfectly and at times do not work at all, but overall 
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they push large firms to perform better. Persistently poor results induce a 
firm’s board of directors to assess the firm’s internal organization to see if it 
needs restructuring. Shareholders often agitate for change; corporate 
funding costs rise and constrain managers from continuing down an un-
profitable path; and, at the limit, activist shareholders agitate for the firm to 
be broken up into separate, more tightly organized parts. 
But these corporate controls deteriorate in too-big-to-fail financial firms. 
The most powerful corporate governance control in recent decades has been 
the corporate takeover and breakup of a too-large industrial firm into its 
constituent parts, which induced American industrial conglomerates to 
boldly restructure in the 1980s. If financial firms today were subject to such 
pressure, then firms that become too big would face shareholder breakup 
efforts, some of which would succeed. In this Article, I first analyze the 
interaction between financial corporate structure and the breakup takeover—
the strongest corporate governance tool, despite its ongoing rarity—to 
explain why the strongest tool in the corporate governance toolbox cannot 
work for too-big-to-fail firms. More tellingly, most day-to-day corporate 
pressures and controls for boards to resize, spin off, and restructure also 
cannot work well, or at all, in the too-big-to-fail financial firm.  
The explanation—that too-big-to-fail finance is restructuring-proof—is 
not yet integral to the analytics of the too-big-to-fail problem. Its core 
explanation is as follows: The likelihood that big finance will be bailed out 
in a crisis lowers the financial firms’ cost of funding. These lower financing 
costs redound to the benefit of the firms’ shareholders. This much is well 
known. But then the implicit too-big-to-fail subsidy operates as a shadow 
poison pill, resembling the governance defense that managers and boards 
have used successfully for the past quarter-century to ward off unwanted 
takeovers in the industrial sector. The traditional poison pill dilutes only the 
offeror’s stock, thereby discouraging offers to buy the target company. 
Hence, the conventional pill impedes outsiders, but not insiders. In contrast, 
the too-big-to-fail “pill” also impedes insiders—a controlling shareholder 
where there is one, the board of directors, and the CEO—from restructuring 
the firm, even if such a restructuring would be operationally wise. 
An operationally successful restructuring of such a too-big-to-fail finan-
cial firm will increase the firm’s (or its spun-off divisions’) overall value to 
the economy, but it will decrease the private value of the firm’s stock to the 
extent the restructuring strengthens the constituent firms enough—or 
makes them sufficiently small that they are no longer too-big-to-fail. If the 
constituent parts would no longer be too big, then, as long as the expected 
value of the subsidy lost exceeds that of the restructuring gains, stockholders 
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lack the incentive to restructure the firm and have reason to oppose even 
operationally efficient changes that would result in the loss of that subsidy. 
Corporate governance at the too-big-to-fail financial firm degrades. The 
benefited firm need not even be aware that the profitability of a line of 
business depends on the too-big-to-fail boost; it just finds that operational 
change in the subsidized environment is unprofitable. 
This corporate degradation hurts the economy as a whole. Just as a mo-
nopolist will invest to protect its monopoly benefits up to the private profit 
the monopoly provides the firm, a too-big-to-fail firm will sacrifice its own 
efficiency—along with the efficiency of the economy’s financial system—up 
to the cost of its subsidy advantage. The full size of the too-big-to-fail 
subsidy—estimated after the financial crisis to be in the tens of billions of 
dollars annually—can thereby be lost to the economy, allowing the too-big-
to-fail firm to take on activities that could be handled more efficiently 
elsewhere in the economy.  
In Part I, I describe the 2012–2013 controversy over JPMorgan Chase’s 
London Whale and the bank’s $6 billion trading loss, which embarrassed the 
firm, derailed previously successful executives’ careers, and led to congres-
sional investigations and negative media attention. The managerial lapse 
induced two contrasting classes of responses: One sought more regulation 
because even America’s strongest big bank could make a major mistake. The 
other dismissed the problem as a huge loss for shareholders and managers, 
but one whose size was well within both JPMorgan Chase’s $20 billion in 
annual earnings and its $200 billion of bank capital. Similarly, respected 
commentators argued that although big finance has become too large to be 
efficient, market forces will eventually induce the too-big financial firms to 
resize. 
 In Part II, I analyze the conceptual impact of the too-big-to-fail subsidy 
on financial firms’ cost of funding, which operates as a powerful corporate 
poison pill. The subsidy destroys takeover value for a shareholder who 
would buy up the firm’s stock and break up a far-too-big banking conglom-
erate. Less dramatically, but more importantly, the potential loss of the too-
big-to-fail subsidy also reduces the value of day-to-day corporate restructuring 
strategies that managers and boards might otherwise pursue. Managers at 
an orphaned subsidiary might, for example, seek financing to buy those 
operations out from the financial conglomerate, believing they can run the 
spun-off operation better than the far-off senior managers at the bank’s 
headquarters. But the buyout’s funding would not garner the too-big-to-fail 
subsidy that the entire financial firm gets. Hence, the divisional managers 
and their financial backers face higher financing costs and cannot buy out a 
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division even if the buyout would otherwise be profitable and operationally 
wise. The too-big-to-fail “pill” degrades both internal and external incen-
tives to build better, stronger corporate structures. Importantly, the firm’s 
senior managers need not seek the too-big-to-fail subsidy—and may even 
deny its existence—but the subsidy will still drive their fundamental 
structural decisions, as they weigh the costs and benefits of restructuring. 
In Part III, I examine too-big-to-fail data, which measures what the too-
big firm saves on its borrowings due to lowered funding costs. Reconfiguring 
the existing data as a percentage of shareholder profits shows estimates that 
the financial crisis led to the too-big-to-fail subsidy increasing financial 
firms’ profits by about one-third beyond what they would otherwise have 
been. The overall picture is of a subsidy amounting then to the size of the 
takeover premium needed to motivate a takeover. If this level persists, 
operationally efficient internal restructurings to downsize or spin off will 
often not make economic sense to the firm, its managers, or its shareholders. 
In Part IV, I examine related economic concepts emanating from anti-
trust analysis of the costs of monopoly. Applying that thinking to financial 
firms shows how the extended costs of too-big-to-fail can put a protective 
umbrella over degraded organizational integrity, shielding it from pressures 
to fix it. Moreover, an oligopoly protective umbrella can impede restructuring 
apart from the too-big-to-fail umbrella for reasons similar to the too-big-to-
fail analytic, if restructuring would cause the firm to lose those oligopoly 
profits. The main results of this Article can be reached without a too-big-to-
fail subsidy, if there is an oligopolistic financial sector. 
In Part V, we examine other, parallel degradation due to too-big-to-fail 
status, including excessive leverage, regulatory degradation, inability to raise 
new capital, and other social costs. While these risk-based regulatory 
problems arising from too-big-to-fail finance have been well examined, the 
corporate governance problems of boards, breakups, spinoffs, and the like 
have not.  
In Part VI, I examine the public policy implications, opportunities, and 
difficulties, focusing on incentive effects and fixes. The ongoing policy 
efforts fall into two main categories: command-and-control instructions to 
increase financial firm capital and limit firms’ riskiest activities, and stronger 
failure resolution mechanisms that make failure an option for big financial 
firms. Each category—command-and-control and making failure an option—
could reduce the too-big-to-fail problem. The structural degradation 
analytic further justifies those efforts.  
The corporate governance incentive analytics here also suggest a further, 
largely undiscussed policy foray: policymakers can alter the internal incentives 
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of shareholders, boards, and managers, making their incentives better match 
the public interest, primarily by making risky debt more expensive for the 
financial firm. I outline how this could be achieved. American finance could 
be improved by using all three categories of policy tools. As of now, it uses 
only two. 
In Part VII, I consider what big finance would look like without the too-
big-to-fail subsidy. Firms with shareholder-centered corporate governance 
did worse in the financial crisis than firms with weak shareholder orienta-
tion, and the analytics here show why that was so and why, without the 
subsidy, they should have done better. The policy implication of the degra-
dation conceptualized here is not to further unleash shareholders with 
distorted incentives inside big finance, but rather to reorient their incentives 
to reduce the distortions and thereby better align shareholders’ incentives 
with the public’s.  
Lastly, I sketch out the dealmaking impact if the too-big firms’ funding 
boost disappears—as industry proponents and some analysts say has already 
been, or will shortly be, achieved. Normal corporate processes would press 
to restructure and downsize the biggest and least efficient firms. Ending the 
subsidy, or even cutting back the big increase from the financial crisis, 
should unleash the usual market mechanisms that facilitate right-sizing of 
corporations. Board and managerial incentives would better match public 
goals. If better regulation slashes the large too-big-to-fail subsidy that we 
have had, then big finance should restructure on its own.  
The change we would see could include dramatic, activist-driven 
breakups and spinoffs, but much of the corporate governance effort would 
be slow and internal: new ventures would need a higher hurdle rate to be 
justified, while some major old ventures would become uncompetitive and 
then be sold. This latter, internal process would not be a dramatic, nearly 
instant revolutionary restructuring, but a steady, multiyear evolutionary 
rebuilding of the biggest financial firms—a rebuilding that would make the 
American financial system safer, stronger, and better for the American 
economy. 
I. THE LONDON WHALE AND JPMORGAN’S $6 BILLION  
TRADING LOSS 
A. The Events and the Corporate Governance Failure 
The London Whale debacle is now well known in financial circles. 
JPMorgan Chase, America’s largest bank, is reputed to be America’s best-
managed bank, with the widely respected Jamie Dimon as its chief executive 
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officer. Yet, despite its reputation, mismanaged trades—initiated by the 
London Whale—lost the bank $6 billion. (In professional poker, and some-
times in financial markets, a “whale” is a poor player with a thick wallet.) 
When the economy improved after the 2007–2009 financial crisis, 
JPMorgan concluded it was prudent to reduce its exposure to credit derivatives 
whose value depended on a weak economy. Because of illiquidity in that 
market, JPMorgan traders decided not to sell the positions they had already 
taken, but instead to buy new, opposite positions, although with different 
maturities.1 A JPMorgan trader based in London—the Whale—made many 
of these trades.2 However, as credit markets rallied in early 2012, the 
original positions lost even more value, and the new positions’ profits did 
not make up for those continued losses. Worse, the larger portfolio became 
too big, too complex, and too unwieldy to manage well. JPMorgan owned 
too much of this market, and when management finally decided to unwind 
the trades by selling many off, it found that there were no longer enough 
buyers. JPMorgan itself had been the primary buyer in many of the underlying 
markets, and the assets could not be sold at desirable prices.3 
JPMorgan’s first public accounting pegged the loss at $2 billion, about 
one-tenth of the bank’s annual profit. Questions immediately arose as to the 
quality of JPMorgan’s risk management team—previously reputed to be 
stellar—since they had allowed the bank to be cornered with such a large 
position. If JPMorgan could not manage these risks appropriately, how 
would less well-managed banks fare? As the story unfolded, JPMorgan’s 
losses mounted. By the time the bank had closed out its position, it had lost 
$6 billion. 
Congress and the media excoriated Dimon and JPMorgan’s senior man-
agement for failing to control the original trades, for failing to wind them 
down at lower loss levels, for being uninformed about the full extent of 
 
1 See JPMorgan Chase Whale Trades: A Case History of Derivatives Risks and Abuses: Hearing 
Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, 
113th Cong. 104 (2013) [hereinafter JPM Whale Trades Hearing] (statement of Ina R. Drew, Former 
Head, Chief Investment Office, JPMorgan Chase & Co.). 
2 Gregory Zuckerman & Katy Burne, ‘London Whale’ Rattles Debt Market, WALL ST. J., Apr. 
6, 2012, at A1. 
3 See JPM Whale Trades Hearing, supra note 1, at 156 (report by the Majority and Minority 
Staff of the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t 
Affairs) (describing the severity of JPMorgan’s losses); Katy Burne, Making Waves Against ‘Whale,’ 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 2012, at C1 (“J.P. Morgan sold so much of the index swaps . . . that the cost 
of default protection on that basket of companies fell sharply . . . . [After JPMorgan stopped 
trading, t]he cost of [default protection] on the index rose . . . .”). 
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JPMorgan’s vulnerability on the trades, and for misleading the public and 
regulators about the trades’ size and its embedded loss.4 
B. The Conventional Corporate Governance Wisdom 
JPMorgan’s senior management stumbled badly. The antibank critique 
is that the lapse shows how banks are still taking too many risks. At Senate 
hearings on the Whale and the loss, senators argued that the Whale debacle 
justified moving financial trading largely out of banks because future losses 
could be even larger—so large that they could lead to another bailout. As is 
now well known, big financial firm managers have reason to accept otherwise 
too-large risks in too-big-to-fail financial firms: If the risk pays off, share-
holders gain and managers get big bonuses. If the risk turns out badly, then 
shareholders and other financiers of the firm are unhappy, but the government 
will bail out many of them. This makes the downside for a too-big-to-fail 
financial firm not as unpleasant as it would be for a typical industrial firm, 
which would have to file for bankruptcy when a major risk turns out badly. 
But this risk-taking view has been met by a powerful rebuttal favoring a 
“hands-off” approach, arguing that the bank’s shareholders, and not the 
public, bore the brunt of the loss. 
1. A Loss Well Within Shareholders’ Equity 
Compare the size of the Whale’s trading loss to the size of JPMorgan. 
The loss, albeit tremendous, amounted to less than one-third of JPMorgan’s 
2012 profits and only three percent of its $200 billion of capital.5 It was well 
within shareholders’ equity and, the bank’s defenders assert, is a shareholder 
problem, not a public problem. “Why should the public be worried,” 
JPMorgan supporters asked, “about that loss in a year of otherwise extraor-
dinary profit for the bank?”6 
 
4 See JPM Whale Trades Hearing, supra note 1, at 165 (report by the Majority and Minority 
Staff of the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t 
Affairs); Editorial, Lessons from the London Whale, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2013, at SR10. 
5 See JPMorgan Chase & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 62 (Feb. 28, 2013). 
6 William Jaenike, Letter to the Editor, JPMorgan’s Trading Loss, N.Y. TIMES, Mar 24, 2013, 
at BU5. JPMorgan’s former CEO William B. Harrison said, “It was disappointing to all of us that 
we had that kind of loss, but the important thing is to put it into perspective, which the market didn’t 
do very well . . . . A lot of people overreacted to it.” Dawn Kopecki, Harrison Says Public Overreacted 
to JPMorgan’s CIO Trading Loss, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2012-09-05/harrison-says-public-overreacted-to-jpmorgan-s-cio-trading-loss.html. Consider the 
view of a senior banking analyst: “The holding company made $29.9 billion in operating income 
and just over $20 billion in net income for 2011. . . . [T]he reported losses, in and of themselves, 
are not likely to have a dramatic impact on J.P. Morgan’s long-term financial stability.” Gene 
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2. Shareholder- and Board-Based Governance Will Remedy 
Serious losses can activate shareholder-based corporate governance in 
industrial firms. Shareholders agitate for boardroom change; boards often 
replace senior managers; and, in extreme cases, shareholders force the 
breakup of a too-big-to-manage firm into its constituent business lines.7  
A big industrial firm that is far above its optimal size should attract such 
attention, and often enough does. Perhaps the same could become a reality 
for too-big financial firms. Indeed, Henry Kaufmann, long one of Wall 
Street’s leading financial analysts, announced that the heyday of the large 
American financial conglomerate was over.8 Shareholder value in financial 
firms would be enhanced by spinoffs, breakups, and divisional buyouts. 
Since that kind of restructuring would enhance shareholder value, share-
holders would make it happen.9 America’s financial conglomerates would be 
restructured in the 2010s in the same way that America’s overgrown indus-
trial conglomerates were restructured in the 1980s. Other mainstream 
analytics have been similar.10 
One could extend this corporate analysis. Internal forces can restructure 
the too-big conglomerate. Managers at financial divisions could buy out 
their division if it can be better managed when separated from the firm’s 
core. Boards reviewing the firm’s future strategy could conclude that far-off 
divisions cannot be managed well and should be spun off. Activist share-
holders might undertake proxy fights to elect new directors to bring about 
operational changes. Such proxy fights often fail,11 but firms often eventually 
implement policies similar to those sought by the shareholder activists. 
Ordinary corporate governance measures could therefore diminish potential 
financial losses of the size of JPMorgan’s London Whale trading loss. 
Regulation was needed, in this view, only to handle the chance that the loss 
 
Kirsch, J.P. Morgan Chase: Putting Losses in Perspective, WEISS RATINGS (May 11, 2012), 
http://www.weissratings.com/news/articles/jp-morgan-chase-putting-losses-in-perspective. 
7 RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE 
ACQUISITIONS 357-62 (2d ed. 1995).  
8 Henry Kaufman, Big Banks Are Not the Future, WALL ST. J., June 6, 2012, at A15 (“The 
halcyon days of large financial conglomerates are over.”). 
9 Id. 
10 See Lionel Barber, The Fall of the Universal Bank, ECONOMIST: WORLD IN 2013, Nov. 8, 
2012, at 142 (“The decline of the universal bank will pass unlamented. The . . . financial super-
market has long been eclipsed by the destruction of shareholder value after the crash.”). 
11 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 677 
(2007); Steven M. Davidoff, Andrew C.W. Lund & Robert Schonlau, Do Outside Directors Face 
Labor Market Consequences? A Natural Experiment from the Financial Crisis, HARV. BUS. L. REV. 
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 3), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2200552. 
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would exceed the value of the bank’s equity, because only that kind of loss 
would put the public fisc at risk. 
*      *      * 
Overall, a plausible analytic for JPMorgan and the $6 billion Whale 
loss—and one with which reasonable analysts agree—is that (1) the problem 
is one for shareholders and managers, not the public, and (2) the normal 
forces of corporate governance would press to right-size the big financial 
firms, if they are indeed operating at too big a scale. That powerful defense 
of JPMorgan was embedded in its CEO’s comment that the loss was “[a] 
tempest in a teapot.”12  
II. STRUCTURAL DEGRADATION DUE TO THE IMPACT OF  
TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL 
We take this standard corporate incentive-for-efficiency story, deepen it, 
and then explore how too-big-to-fail pressures warp the incentives of 
shareholders, boards, and managers, thereby degrading corporate govern-
ance. Some financial firms may become both too-big-to-manage (an idea 
discussed in the literature13) and, because the normal corporate governance 
constraints turn off due to the too-big-to-fail subsidy (an idea that, although 
not in the literature, is our focus here), the firm is thereby rendered even 
more susceptible to both specific error—such as the failure of senior 
management to oversee the trading desk properly, resulting in the $6 billion 
London Whale—and general error—such as the firm swelling beyond its 
optimal size and scope because the optimal size would lose the too-big-to-
fail subsidy. This potential for systematic organizational degradation at too-
big-to-fail firms is extensive, important, and not yet well analyzed. 
Normal shareholder, managerial, and board incentives and pressures to 
right-size and restructure firms degrade and disappear in too-big-to-fail 
financial firms. Too-big-to-fail status lowers the firm’s cost of capital, and 
that funding advantage would be lost to the firm by an operationally 
 
12 JPM Whale Trades Hearing, supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Sen. Carl Levin, Chairman, 
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs).  
13 E.g., Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, The Big Banks: Too Complex to Manage?, CENTRAL 
BANKER, Winter 2012/2013, at 8; Neil Irwin, JPMorgan Is Close to a Record $13 Billion Settlement. Is 
It Too Big to Manage?, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Oct. 20, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/10/20/jpmorgan-is-close-to-a-record-13-billion-settlement-is-it-too-big-to-
manage; Ben W. Heineman, Jr., Too Big to Manage: JP Morgan and the Mega Banks, HARV. BUS. 
REV. BLOG NETWORK (Oct. 3, 2013), http://blogs.hbr.org/2013/10/too-big-to-manage-jp-
morgan-and-the-mega-banks. 
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sensible restructuring. The threat of losing that value acts as a poison pill 
does in an industrial firm: Operational value could be created if a share-
holder activist succeeded, but due to the pill, the activist cannot capture that 
value for itself. Knowing that it cannot capture the value that it wants to 
create, the activist desists from activism. Improving the too-big-to-fail 
organization is not, here, in shareholders’ interests. Worse than the pill, the 
subsidy also curtails internal incentives for boards, managers, or any con-
trolling shareholders to right-size their financial firm to be operationally 
efficient. The private incentives induce affected firms to be less efficient 
than they would otherwise be. 
A. Too-Big-to-Fail as Poison Pill 
A simple poison pill works as follows: The corporate board issues preferred 
stock to its current shareholders. If a control-altering event occurs (such as a 
single stockholder accumulating more than 10% of a firm’s common stock), 
then the terms of that preferred stock issue allow each old shareholder to 
redeem his or her preferred shares for, say, ten shares of new common stock 
for each old share of preferred stock. The new 10% shareholder-intruder, 
however, is barred by the terms of the old preferred stock from participating 
in the exchange for new stock. The pill dilutes the activist shareholder’s 
common stock, poisoning its incentives to be active: it would have ten 
percent of the common stock and be ready for action operationally, but, 
anticipating that remaining stockholders would dilute her 10% holding, the 
activist shies away from buying up the target firm’s stock. In other varia-
tions, the poison has the target making a large payment to a supplier, or 
losing a key supplier, if control shifts inside the firm.14  
The too-big-to-fail subsidy works analogously. If the subsidy lowers the 
financial firm’s financing costs, then the activist who is confident that it can 
fix the target firm’s business must also swallow the “poison” of the target 
firm losing that funding subsidy. A restructuring would need to be big 
enough to recover this funding loss before change agents could profit from 
enhancing a financial firm’s corporate efficiency.  
 
14 See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 7, at 741-47. Structural impediments to takeover, such 
as lucrative contracts for the target firm that expire upon the change-of-control of the firm, are 
even more analogous to the too-big-to-fail subsidy: the structural impediment would visit the 
costs of the change-of-control on all shareholders, as does the loss of the too-big-to-fail funding 
advantage, whereas the pill visits its costs on the activist in the first instance. See generally Jennifer 
Arlen, Regulating Post-Bid Embedded Defenses: Lessons from Oracle Versus PeopleSoft, 12 HARV. 
NEGOT. L. REV. 71 (2007). 
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B. Too-Big-to-Fail as Breakup Protection 
Consider the weakened incentive for internally generated spinoffs and 
breakups. Suppose a financial firm’s board decides that one of its businesses 
does not fit well with the firm’s overall strategic plans and that keeping it in 
the firm is holding down its stock price. It plans to sell it, or spin it off. The 
financial firm would then plan to retire the debt that it had originally used 
to finance the misfit.  
But as long as decreased funding costs due to the too-big-to-fail subsidy 
make up for the shortfall resulting from degraded operations, the board and 
managers should find it profitable to hold onto the misfit. The board may 
explicitly realize that the subsidy and lowered cost of funding have this 
negative operational impact. Or they may find that when they seek to sell 
the misfit, the investment bankers come back to the board with low bids 
from firms that are not too-big-to-fail. The bids are low because the bidders 
lack access to the same cheap, subsidized funding that the too-big-to-fail 
firm enjoys. The board can conclude that the spinoff is a bad deal for them, 
without having consciously sought to obtain, retain, or even analyze the too-
big-to-fail subsidy. 
C. Too-Big-to-Fail as Stymieing the Managerial Divisional Buyout 
Firms often divest divisions and subsidiaries that have come to fit poorly 
with the rest of the firm’s business. Managers at an orphaned division 
commonly buy out their division. They borrow considerably, find some 
equity capital for the buyout, and buy up a division or a subsidiary that they 
are motivated to run well.15 The too-big-to-fail subsidy weakens both the 
buyers’ and sellers’ incentives for the divestiture or the buyout. The buyer’s 
cost of funding is higher than that of the too-big-to-fail firm. The subsidiary’s 
managers find their funding costs cannot support the buyout. They may 
believe that they will increase the division’s profitability by 50% after the 
spinoff, but their funding costs would be 50% higher than those of the 
parent company. The parent company board will consider the managerial 
buyout, but they will ultimately find the price too low. This process could 
even occur without the parent firm’s managers or board being aware of the 
 
15 See WILLIAM J. CARNEY, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 7 (2d ed. 2007) (asserting that 
divestitures are common when an acquisition fails and is undone); DAVID J. RAVENSCRAFT & 
F.M. SCHERER, MERGERS, SELL-OFFS, AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 167-68, 171 (1987); 
Steven N. Kaplan & Michael S. Weisbach, The Success of Acquisitions: Evidence from Divestitures, 47 
J. FIN. 107, 113, 133 (1992) (finding that 22% of divestitures in the sample studied were sold to 
management groups); Michael E. Porter, From Competitive Advantage to Corporate Strategy, HARV. 
BUS. REV., May–June 1987, at 43, 52. 
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subsidy. The managers or the board compare the funding costs of the 
buyout with the value of the division and find that the numbers do not 
match, attributing their cheaper funding to their own superior efficiency. 
D. The Required Takeover Premium 
Consider now the extreme corporate governance restructuring that occurs 
via a breakup takeover. Reducing the chance of a takeover is not the most 
important degradation due to subsidy—to the contrary, hostile takeovers are 
rare now even for industrial firms, financial regulation impedes takeover in 
the banking and other financial industries, and the most important incentive 
degradation occurs inside the financial firm rather than outside it. But 
examining the antitakeover incentives illustrates vividly the transactional 
possibilities foreclosed by the too-big-to-fail subsidy.  
Historically, the premium needed to effectuate a takeover was an offer 
50% above the pretakeover price of the target firm’s stock.16 That needed 
premium is roughly comparable in size to the 33% or bigger subsidy derived 
from several postcrisis studies.17 As such, assuming that a bank’s unsubsi-
dized operations would earn $2, its profits would be $3 due to the subsidy. If 
the bank lost that subsidy in degraded operations—putting the profit level 
back to $2—then a takeover activist would find a takeover unprofitable, even 
though it believed it could raise the firm’s profitability (and presumably its 
stock value) by 50%—back to the pretakeover $3. 
Consider this antitakeover problem in greater detail. If a financial firm’s 
profitability is $2 per annum, and its stock price is $20, then the takeover 
entrepreneur who believes it can make the firm worth $30 by raising the 
firm’s annual operating income to $3 or breaking it up into parts worth $30 
in the aggregate, may offer up to a 50% premium over the ongoing price of 
$20. A deal would be viable between the market price of $20 per share and 
the takeover activist’s assessment that the firm can be turned into a $30-per-
share firm. 
But if, due to the subsidy, the financial firm’s stock price is already trading 
at $30 and earning $3 per share annually, the takeover entrepreneur would 
realize that it could not profit from a takeover. Even if it could add $1 per 
share to the overall annual operating earnings by restructuring the firm, the 
firm would only be worth $30 per share—not $40 per share—if the opera-
tionally sensible restructuring induced the bank to lose its too-big-to-fail 
status and the accompanying subsidy of $1 per share. 
 
16 GILSON & BLACK, supra note 7, at 600. 
17 See infra Table 1. 
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The takeover activist, after running these numbers, would withdraw. 
Even if it were confident that the target financial firm could be put on a 
sounder operational foundation, it would desist from agitating for its takeover 
and breakup. Thus, the too-big-to-fail firm has become takeover-proof. 
A large too-big-to-fail subsidy would similarly dilute, reduce, and quite 
plausibly eliminate the board’s incentive to proceed with operationally 
profitable restructurings on behalf of shareholders. Even a controlling 
shareholder would likely desist, unlike an efficiency-minded controller of a 
large but not too-big-to-fail industrial firm. 
*      *      * 
Related channels of corporate governance degradation are in play, involv-
ing excess leverage, misshapen executive compensation, increased risk, and 
how the too-big-to-fail subsidy incentivizes lobbying for poor regulation.18 
Before considering these channels, however, we first examine the data on 
too-big-to-fail financial institutions. 
III. THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF BEING TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL: DATA 
The data on the too-big-to-fail subsidy comes primarily in two forms: 
First, rating agencies estimate the difference in quality between the big 
banks’ stand-alone strength and their enhanced strength with the govern-
ment backup. The ratings showed a large postcrisis gap between the two, 
with the gap narrowing more recently. Second, economists measured the 
subsidy either by comparing funding costs of large and small banks to 
estimate how much less expensive the big banks’ debt financing costs are, or 
by comparing the cost of deposits above the insurance limit with the cost of 
insured deposits. (We examine in Part VII the corporate structural conse-
quences of banker claims that the too-big-to-fail subsidy has been, or will 
soon be, eliminated.) 
These numbers seem at some level small—eighty basis points per annum 
in some of the larger estimates, or less than a one-percent discount on the 
amount charged to the banks on their borrowings.19 But consider the size of 
the too-big-to-fail subsidy as a fraction of big firm profit. That is, we 
convert all existing estimates into the value to shareholders. The too-big-to-
fail subsidy has amounted to a large fraction, sometimes half, of the big 
banks’ shareholder profits in many studies, and 15% or so of profits in the 
 
18 See infra Part V. 
19 See infra Tables 1 & 2 and sources cited therein. (A basis point is 1/100 of one percent.) 
  
2014] Structural Corporate Degradation 1433 
 
lower estimates. Losing these sums—15% to 50% of profits—would be 
serious setbacks. 
A. The Data: Concept 
A straightforward example illustrates why small funding savings of, say, 
one percent per annum on a financial firm’s borrowings could have a big 
impact on its profits and, hence, shareholder value.  
Financial firms are heavily leveraged. Take one worth $100, with 10% of 
its funding coming from stockholders’ equity and 90% from debt.20 Assume 
that equityholders expect a rate of return of 20% at this firm’s level of risk. 
In other words, they want a return of $2 each year. 
The lenders estimate that while the chance of failure is only 1 in 100 
annually, failure would be a total operational loss were there no government 
bailout. But because the lenders anticipate that the government will bail the 
firm out and pay them the $90 lent if the firm fails, the lenders lower the 
interest rate they charge by 1% because the 1 in 100 chance of failure will not 
be costly to the lenders.21 The lenders’ willingness to lower their charge to 
the firm thus reduces the firm’s cost of capital by 0.9% (from 1% of 90), or 
90 basis points. That small percentage of total value is nearly half (45%) of 
the $2 of profit that the heavily leveraged equityholders seek. The subsidy is 
vital to shareholder profit, and losing it would be very serious. 
B. The Data 
Extensive evidence suggests that larger banks have had lower funding 
costs than smaller banks.22 But that does not in itself tell us whether the 
source of their funding advantage is efficiency, subsidy, or something else. 
Examine Figure 1, based on Moody’s postcrisis ratings for the big banks. 
Moody’s rates the quality of loans made to the banks. It separately rates the 
banks on their standalone credit quality and on their full credit quality, 
which adjusts the standalone value for the likelihood that the government 
will support the bank if it were to fail or otherwise be unable to pay back 
lenders. 
 
20  Ignore here that insured deposits make up some of that debt. 
21  Ignore that small depositors are always paid in a bank failure; that short-term lenders and 
large depositors have usually been paid; that others, like long-term bond market lenders, are often 
paid; and that some classes of firms, like large insurers and investment banks, are new to the too-
big-to-fail arena. 
22 Ata Can Bertay, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Harry Huizinga, Do We Need Big Banks? Evidence 
on Performance, Strategy and Market Discipline, 22 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 532, 544 (2013). But 
recent evidence shows that gap is narrowing. 
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As the graphic shows, during and after the financial crisis many large 
financial firms in the United States received a substantial credit quality 
upgrade due to the presence of the de facto government guarantee. Citibank, 
for example, was rated A3 on an overall basis, or investment grade, while 
rated Baa3 on a standalone basis. This standalone rating made it near junk-
bond quality because there would be a substantial chance that the firm 
would default on payment during the life of the relevant bonds.23 This gap, 
although now narrowing, has been common for the larger banks.  
 
Figure 1: Moody’s Bank Debt Ratings, with and without Government Backing24 
 
                        
    Standalone Credit Assessment, including any shareholder group support     
    Systemic  Support               
                        
Aaa                       
Aa1                       
Aa2                       
Aa3                       
A1                       
A2                       
A3                       
Baa1                       
Baa2                       
Baa3                       
Ba1                       
Ba2                       
Ba3                       
    JPMorgan Goldman 
Sachs     
 Morgan 
Stanley 
 Citibank  Bank of 
America   
  
 
 
 
23 MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, KEY DRIVERS OF RATING ACTIONS ON FIRMS 
WITH GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS OPERATIONS 13 ( June 21, 2012) [hereinafter KEY 
DRIVERS] (footnotes omitted). Moody’s has recently been changing its mind, coming to believe 
that regulatory efforts will end too-big-to-fail bailouts. MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, 
MOODY’S CONCLUDES REVIEW OF SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT US BANKS (Nov. 14, 2013) 
[hereinafter MOODY’S CONCLUDES REVIEW]. For the corporate governance consequences of 
the switch—if investors come to believe it to have happened—and the possibility that optimists 
are moving faster than the data warrants, see Part VII. 
24 KEY DRIVERS, supra note 23, at 7 exhibit 4. Perceptions of improved regulation have 
more recently narrowed the Moody’s gap.  
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About a dozen recent academic and regulatory studies measured the too-
big-to-fail subsidy in two ways. First, the studies measured the change in 
this subsidy’s level after the financial crisis, and second, they examined the 
ongoing level of the subsidy. The studies, summarized in Tables 1 and 2 in 
the Appendix, have results in the same general range, with a mean increase 
from pre- to postcrisis amounting to one-third of 2009 profits (Table 1) and 
an ongoing support level of nearly one-half of the averaged 2006, 2009, and 
2012 profits (Table 2), with its size spiking in 2009. Some studies converted 
the rating agencies’ judgments in rating differences into a measure of annual 
subsidy of the firm's debt,25 while others used credit default swaps on bank 
debt26 or different banks’ cost of funds.27 Others measured the different 
rates on deposits above and below the formally guaranteed amount28 or 
differences in bond pricing29 or stock returns.30 Although the studies’ time 
periods, firms studied, and techniques used differed, their bottom line 
results were remarkably similar, with the size of the increase amounting to a 
major fraction of large financial firm profits.  
Consider one prominent study in more detail, a 2011 study associated 
with the International Monetary Fund—“Quantifying Structural Subsidy 
Values for Systemically Important Financial Institutions,” by Kenichi Ueda 
and Beatrice Weder di Mauro—which has typical results.31 Using rating 
agency results, the authors calculated the funding cost advantage from the 
 
25 See ZAN LI, SHISHENG QU & JING ZHANG, MOODY’S ANALYTICS, QUANTIFYING 
THE VALUE OF IMPLICIT GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES FOR LARGE FINANCIAL INSTITU-
TIONS 14 (2011); Bryan Kelly, Hanno Lustig & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, Too-Systemic-to-Fail: 
What Option Markets Imply About Sector-wide Government Guarantees (Chi. Booth, Research Paper 
No. 11-12, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1762312. 
26 See LI, QU & ZHANG, supra note 25, at 13; Frederic A. Schweikhard & Zoe Tsesmelidakis, 
The Impact of Government Interventions on CDS and Equity Markets 2 (Nov. 2012) (un-
published manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1573377. 
27 See Dean Baker & Travis McArthur, The Value of the “Too Big to Fail” Big Bank Subsidy, 
CENTER FOR ECON. & POL’Y RES. 1-2 (Sept. 2009), http://www.cepr.net/documents/ 
publications/too-big-to-fail-2009-09.pdf.  
28 See Stefan Jacewitz & Jonathan Pogach, Deposit Rate Advantages at the Largest Banks 4-7 
(Feb. 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2018474.  
29 See Viral V. Acharya, Deniz Anginer & A. Joseph Warburton, The End of Market Disci-
pline? Investor Expectations of Implicit State Guarantees 6-7 (Dec. 2013) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1961656.  
30 See Elijah Brewer III & Julapa Jagtiani, How Much Did Banks Pay to Become Too-Big-to-Fail 
and to Become Systemically Important, 43 J. FIN. SERV. RES. 1, 4 (2013); Priyank Gandhi & Hanno 
Lustig, Size Anomalies in U.S. Bank Stock Returns, J. FIN. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 2), available at 
http://www.afajof.org/details/journalArticle/5437471/Size-Anomalies-in-U_S_-Bank-Stock-Returns.html 
(same). 
31 Kenichi Ueda & Beatrice Weder di Mauro, Quantifying Structural Subsidy Values for Systemi-
cally Important Financial Institutions, 37 J. BANKING & FIN. 3830 (2013). 
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better rating due to government backup. They estimated that the funding 
subsidy increased by twenty basis points (0.2% annually) during the finan-
cial crisis, presumably because lenders raised their estimate of the govern-
ment’s willingness to bail out a wide range of firms and because the 
likelihood of bank failure seemed higher than usual. Because financial firms 
use so much debt and so little equity to finance themselves (with debt ten or 
twenty times the size of their equity), saving funding costs of 0.2% annually 
on the debt can amount to 15-20% of the banks’ profits.   
Baker and McArthur, authors of another prominent work measuring the 
size of the too-big-to-fail subsidy, also focused on funding cost changes over 
time.  During the precrisis years, from 2000 through 2007, larger banks with 
more than $100 billion in assets had a funding cost advantage over smaller 
banks of 0.29%. This advantage widened during the 2007–2009 financial 
crisis to 0.78%, an increase of 49 basis points, presumably because the big 
banks were seen as likely to be bailed out, while smaller financial firms were 
not.  This increase translated to an annual funding cost advantage for the 18 
large banks of $34 billion, an amount equivalent to half of the financial 
firms’ combined 2009 profit. 
Table 2 summarizes the measured baseline levels of the too-big-to-fail 
advantage of the big financial firms, reconfigured as a percentage of profits 
and averaged over their 2006, 2009, and 2012 profits. Overall, the data point 
to a substantial baseline advantage, amounting to a noticeable fraction of 
financial firm profits, with the size of the advantage increasing noticeably 
during the financial crisis. An IMF study with later, 2013 data had results 
with a similar bottom line.32 
Big banks surely have size-based efficiencies and big firms’ bonds are 
more liquid than small firms’ bonds.33 It is possible that the big banks have 
 
32 Int’l Monetary Fund, How Big Is the Implicit Subsidy for Banks Considered Too Important to 
Fail?, in GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 101, 104, 114 (Apr. 2014). 
33 See Joseph P. Hughes & Loretta J. Mester, Who Said Large Banks Don’t Experience Scale 
Economies? Evidence from a Risk-Return-Driven Cost Function, 22 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 559, 
578-80 (2013); GLOBAL MKTS. INST., GOLDMAN SACHS, MEASURING THE TBTF EFFECT 
ON BOND PRICING 3 (2013), available at http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/public-
policy/regulatory-reform/measuring-tbtf-doc.pdf. For reviews of the evidence concluding that big 
finance is inefficient, see Richard Davies & Belinda Tracey, Too Big to Be Efficient? The Impact of 
Implicit Subsidies on Estimates of Scale Economies for Banks, 46 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 219 
(Supp. 1 2014); Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Harry Huizinga, Are Banks Too Big to Fail or Too Big to 
Save? International Evidence from Equity Prices and CDS Spreads, 37 J. BANKING & FIN. 875, 893 
(2013); Robert DeYoung & Chao Jiang, Economies of Scale and the Economic Role of Banks 
(May 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.vgsf.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/ 
P/DeYoung_and_Jiang_May_22_2013.pdf; and Hulusi Inanoglu et al., Analyzing Bank Efficiency: 
Are “Too-Big-to-Fail” Banks Efficient? 15-16 ( Jan. 7, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://michaeljacobsjr.com/InanogluJacobsLiuSickles_BankEfficiency_1-7-12.pdf. Cf. John H. 
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efficiencies from scale economies and also benefit from substantial too-big-
to-fail distortions. Some probably enjoy oligopolistic profits. Each boost to 
profitability probably fluctuates over time.34 
A large fraction of the postcrisis funding advantage, however, seems 
likely to have come from the too-big-to-fail subsidy. The studies in Table 1 
measure the increase in funding advantages for big finance after the finan-
cial crisis. Since it is highly unlikely that big finance became more efficient 
due to the crisis, the measured increase seems best attributable to the 
market seeing too-big-to-fail support as increasingly likely.35 Several 
historical studies analogously attributed financial firm mergers to the desire 
to obtain the too-big-to-fail funding benefits.36 A recent study with more 
finely tuned empirics finds a large part of the funding advantage due to 
subsidy effects, not efficiency.37 
*      *      * 
Nevertheless, too-big-to-fail is a variable, not a constant. If big finance 
shrinks, becomes more stable and less interconnected, or becomes better 
regulated, the too-big-to-fail subsidy can decrease, as bank spokespeople and 
some analysts now argue has been occurring. Below, in Part VII, I address 
the sharp corporate governance consequences one should observe if the too-
big-to-fail subsidy dramatically shrinks.38 
 
Boyd & Amanda Heitz, The Social Costs and Benefits of Too-Big-to-Fail Banks: A “Bounding” 
Exercise 11-12 (Feb. 8, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://casee.asu.edu/ 
upload/TBTF_AER_Final_New_Title.pdf. 
34 For an examination of the corporate consequences if the high too-big-to-fail subsidy dis-
appears, see infra Part VII. 
35 Davies & Tracey, supra note 33, at 221-22. 
36 See Edward J. Kane, Incentives for Banking Megamergers: What Motives Might Regulators Infer 
from Event-Study Evidence?, 32 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 671, 673 (2000) (“[A]ny merger 
that strengthens market presumptions that a megabank acquirer is ‘Too Big to Fail and Un-
wind’ . . . lowers that entity’s financing costs.”). But see George J. Benston et al., Motivations for 
Bank Mergers and Acquisitions: Enhancing the Deposit Insurance Put Option Versus Earnings Diversification, 
27 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 777, 787 (1995). See generally Michael C. Keeley, Deposit 
Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 1183, 1198 (1990). 
37 João Santos, Evidence from the Bond Market on Banks’ “Too-Big-to-Fail” Subsidy, FED. RES. 
BANK N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
2419682. Santos compares the gap between bond yields for big and small firms in banking, 
financial institutions outside of banking, and all firms. The banking gap is noticeably larger, 
evidencing that the bank bonds’ funding strength is due in major part to their too-big-to-fail 
boost. (Santos measures the too-big-to-fail boost in several ways, with measures ranging up to a 92 
basis-point boost. For the Table 2 measure, we used the lowest averaged measure that he reports, 
41 basis points.) 
38 See infra Section VII.B. 
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Moreover, even if the too-big-to-fail subsidy is, and stays, measurably 
large, the subsidy’s size does not tell us with certainty that the corporate 
governance distortions must also be large. Perhaps the degradation is small. 
After all, nonfinancial firms without a too-big-to-fail subsidy misjudge 
risk—the Exxon Valdez debacle, BP Petroleum’s Gulf of Mexico blowout, 
and Union Carbide’s Bhopal tragedy each had risk-mismanagement charac-
teristics akin to the London Whale. For the analytic here to have importance, 
the corporate governance degradation must be empirically important, but 
hard measures of that degradation are few.39 
Finally, note that most studies focus on deposits and long-term debt 
rates to derive a too-big-to-fail subsidy. But for the biggest too-big-to-fail 
banks, much of their funding and operations are in non-deposit, short-term 
debt—the famous derivatives (usually bets on movements of interest rates, 
currencies, and other financial items) and repos (short-term, often overnight 
repurchase agreements). Derivatives and repo contracts are effectively 
prioritized over bonds if the bank fails.40 Because small banks do not use 
these types of short-term debt, the fact that the big banks’ long-term debt 
gets paid after their short-term debt means that, all else equal, their long-
term debt is riskier. Accordingly, it should cost more than the smaller banks’ 
long-term debt. Similarly, counterparties to too-big-to-fail firms should be 
more willing to do business with them than with firms that need to stand on 
their own. This preference will translate into better contracting terms, 
greater business volume, or both for the too-big-to-fail firms. This too-big-
to-fail benefit may well be large and is not captured in traditional measures 
of the benefit, because it flows from better short-term financing and con-
tracting opportunities into shareholder profit.  
IV. THE EXTENDED SOCIAL COSTS 
The too-big-to-fail bailouts at public expense during the 2007–2009 finan-
cial crisis were a source of public anger, inducing Congress to have “no more 
bailouts!” as an organizing rationale for the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress’s 
 
39 Because the too-big-to-fail boost resembles the monopolist’s profit boost, and monopoly 
degradation is better understood, see infra note 47 and Sections IV.A–B, one might expect the 
magnitude of the degradation to be similarly important. But analogues are not the same as 
measured costs. We do know that “banks with a higher probability of government sup-
port . . . have more trading assets on average” and take on more risk. Gara Afonso, João Santos & 
James Traina, Do “Too-Big-to-Fail” Banks Take on More Risk?, 20 FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. 
POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 2, 9). 
40 See Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market’s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 
63 STAN. L. REV. 539, 581-82 (2011); Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives 
and the Bankruptcy Code: Why the Special Treatment?, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 114-16 (2005). 
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major reaction to the financial crisis.41 But, as we have argued thus far, the 
cost of too-big-to-fail finance is not just in bailouts, and not just in the more 
important financial disruption that major financial failure inflicts on the rest 
of the economy. In addition, the financial firm degrades organizationally. 
The costs are direct—the degraded financial firm contributes less to the 
economy—and indirect—because the structural degradation increases the 
chance that the firm will fail in a crisis. In this Part, we extend the analytics 
of these social costs and see how they resemble those of the monopolist. I 
do so for two reasons. The too-big-to-fail umbrella resembles a monopolistic 
or oligopolistic umbrella and oligopolistic organizational deterioration; the 
analogy thereby illustrates. And, since markets for some financial products 
are organized oligipolistically, market structure provides a wider umbrella to 
corporate governance corrective action, one I mention here but do not 
analyze further.42 
A. The Monopolist’s Rectangle 
The classic costs from monopoly come first from the monopolist raising 
its selling price above its own full costs. Consumers pay more and the 
monopolist gets richer.  
 
Figure 2: The Social Costs of the Monopolist’s Rectangle 
 
41  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, and 15 U.S.C.). 
42  Cf. Mark J. Roe, From Antitrust to Corporation Governance: The Corporation and the Law, 
1959–1994, in THE AMERICAN CORPORATION TODAY 102 (Carl Kaysen ed., 1996). 
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As the monopolist raises its price, some consumers who would have pur-
chased at a lower, competitive price decide not to buy at the higher price. 
Only the high-value users continue to buy. The monopolist restricts produc-
tion, selling only to high-value consumers and letting sales to ordinary 
consumers fall by the wayside. The loss from the restricted production is 
represented by the small triangular shape in the middle of Figure 2, often 
called the “deadweight costs” of monopoly.43  
That standard view was transformed in the 1970s, in ways relevant to 
too-big-to-fail corporate degradation.44 The monopolist’s profit, represented 
by the rectangle in Figure 2, had long been seen until then as a simple 
transfer from consumers to monopolist.  
But the value of this gain to the monopolist induces it to defend that 
gain. The monopolist protects its monopoly and that rectangle of profits 
from attack—from upstart competitors, from regulators and other lawmakers, 
or from technological change that could displace the monopolist’s business. 
Its investments in self-protection are social costs, however—deadweight 
damage to the economy as egregious as the lost production of the monopoly 
triangle. The monopolist will invest in this socially costly monopoly protec-
tion in an amount up to the value of that rectangle. 
Worse, there is considerable evidence of organizational degradation in 
publicly owned firms with market power.45 The cushion of monopoly profits 
coming into the firm allows boards and senior managers to dissipate some of 
that value and still provide the firm’s shareholders with a good return. 
B. The Subsidy as Analogous to the Monopolist’s Rectangle 
The too-big-to-fail problem is analogous. The monopoly cushion de-
grades the monopolist’s performance; the too-big-to-fail subsidy degrades 
the too-big-to-fail firm’s operational performance. Begin with Figure 3, 
which illustrates banks’ supply and demand curves for funding in a fully 
 
43 Oligopoly has analogous “deadweight costs” if a small group of firms coordinates a price 
above their own costs. The too-big-to-fail financial sector more resembles the oligopoly context 
than the monopoly one. But the social costs of monopoly are easier to illustrate graphically than 
the oligopoly structure, and nothing is lost conceptually by using monopoly instead of oligopoly. 
44 See Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807, 
810 (1975) (representing monopoly profits by the rectangle in Figure 2, supra); cf. Gordon Tullock, 
The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224, 225-26 (1967) (“[T]he 
rectangle . . . measures the social cost of this waste.”). 
45 For the bank-based literature here, see generally Franklin R. Edwards, Managerial Objec-
tives in Regulated Industries: Expense-Preference Behavior in Banking, 85 J. POL. ECON. 147 (1977); 
and Timothy H. Hannan & Ferdinand Mavinga, Expense Preference and Managerial Control: The 
Case of the Banking Firm, 11 BELL J. ECON. 671 (1980) (finding office expenses and employment 
levels rise in banks in concentrated markets). 
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competitive, nonsubsidized environment. (We introduce the subsidy in 
Figure 4.) The sector seeks funding for its projects, with the x-axis repre-
senting the quantity of funding sought and the y-axis representing its cost. 
The earlier projects sought are the highly profitable projects, so the sector is 
more willing to pay to finance them. Later projects are less profitable, so the 
sector will not pay as much. The demand curve slopes downward, as is 
typical. The supply curve is flat here, showing a single interest rate being 
charged to the firm. The point where the supply and demand curves meet, 
at the intersection of P* and Q*, represents the price that clears the market. 
Q* could also be taken to represent the size of the sector: funding is de-
manded for operations that the sector can implement profitably. 
 
Figure 3: Supply and Demand for Funding an Unsubsidized Too-Big-
to-Fail Sector 
 
 
Next, introduce the too-big-to-fail subsidy. Because financiers to the 
too-big-to-fail sector believe they are likely to be repaid even if the financial 
firm fails, they charge less interest than if the firm’s failure would surely be 
visited upon the lender. Lenders are thus willing to lend more cheaply to 
the too-big-to-fail sector. This willingness is represented by the supply 
curve moving downward, as in Figure 4. 
If the too-big-to-fail financial firms and their managements only pocketed 
the subsidy, production would stay at Q*. The cost of the debt would be 
lower at PS, yielding the firms savings in their cost of capital at the difference 
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between the competitive cost of funds, P*, and the subsidized cost, PS. If 
the financial firm did nothing further, it would enjoy subsidized extra profits 
represented by the rectangle in Figure 4, amounting in size to (P*- PS) x Q*. 
Eventually one of the financial firms would fail and be bailed out. The 
predicted cost to the government would be the sum of the rectangles 
through time, paid to the financial firm’s creditors.  
 
Figure 4: The Too-Big-to-Fail 
Sector’s Rectangle of Potential 
Corporate Degradation 
Figure 5: The Too-Big-to-Fail 
Sector’s Economically Unwarranted 
Expansion 
 
 
 
These then are the well-perceived costs of the system having too-big-to-
fail firms.46 Consider next the added corporate degradation. 
The organizations degrade due to the presence of that rectangle. The 
firms’ managers are not as careful, because the extra profits from the subsidy 
cushion them, and the normal corporate controls on major corporate 
degradation are gone: breakups and some takeovers, and indeed any 
 
46 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET 
RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 5 (Apr. 25, 2012), available at 
http://www.sigtarp.gov/Quarterly%20Reports/April_25_2012_Report_to_Congress.pdf (“A significant 
legacy of [the Troubled Asset Relief Program] is increased moral hazard and potentially disastrous 
consequences associated with institutions deemed ‘too big to fail.’”); Ensuring Ohio Taxpayers Don’t 
Pay for Wall Street’s Failure, SHERROD BROWN, SENATOR FOR OHIO (Mar. 4, 2013), 
http://www.brown.senate.gov/newsroom/newsletters/ensuring-ohio-taxpayers-dont-pay-for-wall-streets- 
failures (“Wall Street megabanks . . . receive taxpayer-funded advantages today simply because of 
their ‘too big to fail’ status.”); Richard W. Fisher, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Dall., Remarks 
Before Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs: Comments on Monetary 
Policy and ‘Too Big To Fail’ (Feb. 27, 2013), available at http://www.dallasfed.org/news/ 
speeches/fisher/2013/fs130227.cfm (“[F]irms capture the financial upside of their actions but largely 
avoid payment—bankruptcy and closure—for actions gone wrong . . . . Such firms enjoy implicit 
subsidies relative to their non-TBTF competitors.”). 
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improvement that makes the firm unsinkable, would cause the firm to lose 
the subsidy, represented by the rectangle in Figure 4. The entire rectangle 
can potentially be lost to the economy.47  
The subsidy initially makes shareholders in the too-big-to-fail sector 
richer. But the too-big-to-fail sector can go down another path. First, big 
finance has reason to expand the scale and scope of its activities. With the 
new cost of funding to the sector at the lower PS, the sector can take on new 
activities with the new, cheaper financing available to it. It can move its 
funding size and activity scale out to QS. These added activities, represented 
by the shaded area in Figure 5, would be more efficiently handled elsewhere 
in the economy. The too-big-to-fail sector takes them on because the sector 
obtains the subsidized, low-cost funding when they do so. As a result, the 
too-big-to-fail sector becomes bigger and more unwieldy. 
C. The Degradation as Another Channel to Financial Crisis 
Thus far we have examined how a too-big-to-fail boost degrades finan-
cial firm efficiency. Another cost emanates from the degradation of their 
efficiency, because financial firms at the hub of the economy then function 
worse than they need to. Failures of financial institutions can be costly to 
the economy, as we learned again during the 2007–2009 financial crisis, 
when financial institutions failed, shrunk, and withdrew from lending, 
thereby weakening the economy.  
Moreover, because corporate governance degradation weakens the firm, 
it becomes more likely to fail. That weakness and failure induce further 
financial failure during a crisis, exacerbating and deepening the basic 
economic costs of a financial crisis, as Figure 6 illustrates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47 Competition inside the too-big-to-fail sector needs to be accounted for. We consider this 
competition in the next Part, where we see that the too-big-to-fail subsidy distorts the competitive 
arena in the sector. 
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Figure 6: The Too-Big-to-Fail Corporate Degradation Channels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 illustrates the multiple channels of too-big-to-fail costs. Arrow (1) and the 
right-hand box represent the standard problems: if a big financial firm collapses, the 
government will typically bail the firm out. But the too-big-to-fail problem also moves 
through a corporate governance channel, via arrow (2), to degrade the corporate quality of 
the subject financial firms. The degraded firms are costly for the economy, because they do 
not function as well as they could, leaving too many big financial firms at the upper right 
corner of Figure 6, weakened via arrow (3). And then, lastly, arrow (4) shows that the 
degraded financial firms have a greater chance of failing, due to the too-big-to-fail corporate 
degradation, raising the chance that the economy will suffer from too-big-to-fail costs at the 
bottom right of Figure 6. 
V. FURTHER CORPORATE DEGRADATION 
Related degradation channels outside the core corporate governance 
institutions of boards and shareholders have been observed before. The 
corporate governance degradation problem I have analyzed here widens 
several of these known channels. First, the subsidy perniciously induces 
affected firms to increase their overhanging risky debt, which distorts corpo-
rate strategy. Second, for too-big-to-fail finance, shareholder-oriented compen-
sation incentivizes boards and managers to use more of the too-big-to-fail 
subsidy and to avoid capital structures that use less of it, further degrading 
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the financial firm’s value to the economy.48 Third, the subsidy distorts the 
competitive arena for the too-big-to-fail sector: in the industrial sector, 
competition can reverse corporate governance degradation; but in the 
financial sector, competition can also further debase corporate structure. 
Fourth, the too-big-to-fail firm distorts prosecutors’ and regulators’ actions, 
in ways that can further degrade corporate governance. Finally, the financial 
players’ unwillingness to lose the too-big-to-fail subsidy impels them to 
create larger, more unwieldy firms—a result that is worse for the economy.  
I expand on several of these channels to show how the corporate degra-
dation analytic deepens these problems. 
A. The Subsidy as Debt Overhang  
Thus far we have seen how the too-big-to-fail subsidy destroys basic 
corporate governance incentives. It also distorts capital structure decisions. 
Capital structure choices can influence the firm’s choice of investments and 
can enhance, or degrade, managerial decisionmaking.49 Too much debt 
induces managers, if loyal to their shareholders, to accept excessive risks 
that the creditors pay for if the risks turn out badly, but that the shareholders 
profit from if they yield good results.50  
Moreover, a shareholder-oriented firm with a lot of risky debt may forgo 
profitable projects, because the benefits go disproportionately to the over-
hanging risky debt.51 Too little debt, on the other hand, could induce 
managers to forgo extra effort because there are no creditors to challenge 
them if the managers forgo a few dollars of extra operational income. 
Hence, in the normal science of capital structure, there’s a tradeoff. 
The too-big-to-fail subsidy distorts this tradeoff. Typically the govern-
ment does not bail out stockholders of the too-big-to-fail firm—only 
 
48 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 
247, 257-61 (2010) (discussing how banker compensation incentivizes executives toward greater 
risk); Sallie Krawcheck, Four Ways to Fix Banks, HARV. BUS. REV., June 2012, at 107, 109-10 
(same); Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive Compensation for Risk 
Regulation, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1205, 1227-28 (2011) (proposing “debt-like” compensation to 
decrease executive risk-taking); Patrick Bolton, Hamid Mehran & Joel Shapiro, Executive 
Compensation and Risk Taking 3-4 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report No. 456, rev. Nov. 
2011), available at www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr456.pdf (advocating linking executive 
compensation to credit default swap spreads to discourage risk-taking and encourage adequate 
capitalization). 
49 See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 
AM. ECON. REV. 323, 324 (1986). 
50 See Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147, 149-55 (1977). 
51 Id. at 149.  
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creditors.52 Hence, the difference in the cost of equity funding and debt 
funding is larger for the too-big-to-fail firm, pushing its board and share-
holders to favor yet more debt in the firm. The firm will be overindebted, 
motivated to forgo solid opportunities for riskier ones.53 The long-run 
corporate governance interest of the depositors’ guarantor diverges from 
that of the shareholders.54 
Prior work has shown how leveraged firms incentivize stockholders to 
take higher risk because the risk is borne disproportionately by the firms’ 
preexisting creditors, while stockholders disproportionately benefit from the 
upside of risk-taking. The concept in this Article is related. Even risk-
preferring stockholders should want the firm to be well managed; they just 
want it to be riskier. But, as we have seen, most of the standard corporate 
mechanisms by which they could achieve that better management are less 
sensible for self-interested shareholders of the too-big-to-fail firm. 
B. Competitive Failure and Marketwide Degradation 
Competitive capital markets incentivize industrial firms to be more effi-
cient than otherwise. For financial firms, the same process could be at work, 
but it is weaker.55  
In the presence of a major too-big-to-fail subsidy for debt, competition’s 
impact on financial firms could be to degrade their efficiency. To corral the 
private benefit of the subsidy, firms that can get the subsidy have reason to 
compete to maximize it.56 But maximizing this private benefit then insulates 
the firm from the useful corporate governance incentives at work in compet-
itive environments lacking this private benefit. As long as the private 
benefit exceeds the expected value of the corporate governance incentives, 
 
52 Bear Stearns was an exception, in that the banking authorities merged Bear into JPMorgan, 
with the Bear stockholders receiving some value. 
53 ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES (2013). The 
excess leverage of the too-big-to-fail bank is an important corporate governance problem induced 
by the too-big-to-fail subsidy. In this Article, I instead examine the general corporate governance 
costs of structural distortion that the too-big-to-fail subsidy induces.  
54 See Peter O. Mülbert, Corporate Governance of Banks After the Financial Crisis: Theory, Evi-
dence, Reforms 19-20 (ECGI Law, Working Paper No. 151/2010, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1448118 (explaining that depositors’ interest is in the ability of the corporation to pay its 
debts). 
55 See Samuel G. Hanson, Anil K. Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein, A Macroprudential Approach to 
Financial Regulation, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2011, at 3, 23-25. 
56 Cf. Anat R. Admati, Peter M. DeMarzo, Martin F. Hellwig & Paul Pfleiderer, Fallacies, 
Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity Is Not Socially 
Expensive 39 (Stanford Graduate Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No. 2065, 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1669704. 
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competition incentivizes the firm to maximize the private benefits, not the 
overall benefits for the economy. 
Worse, competition in the too-big-to-fail sector is not always on matters 
that are in the public interest. Too-big-to-fail institutions may shift their 
businesses from markets in which they compete primarily with other 
financial firms, such as the market for major loans, into markets where 
major competitors do not get the too-big-to-fail subsidy, such as derivatives 
trading in which their balance sheet strength and implicit support makes 
them more desirable trading partners than smaller hedge funds. The latter 
might fail, but the too-big-to-fail firms cannot.  
Or, the big firms direct their competition toward innovative ways to ob-
tain, expand, and use the too-big-to-fail subsidy, not to better service the 
economy. For example, credit default swaps, originally pioneered at JPMor-
gan, were one of the major innovations in big finance in recent decades. 
Their original purpose was to reduce regulatory requirements on bank 
loans.  
The credit default swap innovation at JPMorgan had it turn to an AAA 
investment-grade firm for an obligation that, in the event of a default on the 
underlying loan, the bank and the AAA-rated firm would swap the bank’s 
loan for the AAA firm’s cash. In effect, the AAA firm guaranteed the loan. 
Regulators treated such swap-guaranteed loans as equivalent to the bank 
lending to an AAA-rated firm, so they did not require more capital to back 
up the loan. With the AAA backstop, it was thought that the loan could not 
contribute to the bank’s failure. Many of these credit default swaps were 
written by AIG, the huge, once-investment-grade insurer whose failure, 
partly due to its overexposure in the credit default swap market, was a key 
event in the financial crisis. In effect, innovation maneuvered the financial 
system to be burdened with more too-big-to-fail low-cost financing than it 
would have had otherwise. This innovation was a competitive advantage to 
JPMorgan,57 one that resulted from competition in the too-big-to-fail sector. 
But it was not a competitive result that benefited the American economy. 
C. Too-Big-to-Jail 
Managers and boards about to undertake a dangerous activity, as opposed 
to just making honest mistakes, rightly fear that government prosecutors 
 
57 See GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD 64 (2009) (showing how JPMorgan developed credit 
default swaps to beat precrisis regulatory capital requirements). For the ongoing persistence of 
bank effort to beat the capital requirements and the resulting regulatory pushback, see Brooke 
Masters et al., Basel Watchdog to Close Loophole Over Use of Pricey Credit Protection, FIN. TIMES, 
Mar. 25, 2013, at 1. 
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may punish them with regulatory restriction or, at the extreme, criminal 
prosecution.58 The individual manager’s fear of prosecution could keep him 
or her well away from activity that could damage the firm.  
But prosecutors are wary of putting too-big-to-fail firms or their managers 
on trial. “As Attorney General Eric Holder admitted to the Senate . . . , 
when banks are considered too big to fail it is ‘difficult to prosecute 
them . . . . [I]f we do bring a criminal charge, it will have a negative impact 
on the national economy.’”59 Another restraint on managers of the too-big-
to-fail firm weakens. 
D. How Remaining Corporate Governance Pressures Are Weak or  
Further Degrade the Too-Big-to-Fail Financial Firm 
The too-big-to-fail de facto poison pill does not deter every potential 
corporate governance reform pressure. But these pressures are weaker than 
at industrial firms, and often only exacerbate the governance problems of 
large financial firms. 
Shareholders, for example, may embarrass or replace the CEO or restruc-
ture the board, all without breaking up the firm. Some shareholders tried 
this at JPMorgan Chase following the London Whale fiasco.60 But such 
activists cannot capture the full measure of improvements they induce—a 
normal deficiency in corporate governance—and, worse for the financial 
firm, activist shareholders (1) who improve the target firm would share gains 
not only with other shareholders and financial creditors, but also with the 
government and the overall economy, blunting activists’ incentives even 
more than is usual, and (2) have incentives today to induce the financial 
firm to take more government-subsidized risks that degrade the firm and the 
overall economy, worsening the governance outcome. 
Takeovers of too-big-to-fail firms can proceed nicely—but only if the 
resulting firm is too-big-to-fail, carrying the same or an enhanced subsidy. 
 
58 See Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The Consequences to Managers 
for Financial Misrepresentation, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 193, 202-04 (2008) (finding increased managerial 
turnover among executives at firms that were investigated); Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & 
Gerald S. Martin, The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
581, 606 (2008) (finding that legal penalties are dwarfed by subsequent losses in share value and 
firm reputation following the penalty). 
59 Richard W. Fisher & Harvey Rosenblum, How to Shrink the ‘Too-Big-to-Fail’ Banks, WALL 
ST. J., Mar. 11, 2013, at A17. That is, jailing the senior manager or bringing a criminal action 
against the firm itself would negatively affect the too-big-to-fail financial firm and thereby 
negatively affect the American economy. 
60 See Susanne Craig & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Small Firm Could Turn the Vote on Dimon, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2013, at B1. 
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The takeover would not be a 1980s offer to break up the target, but one to 
build a bigger firm. The recent history of Bank of America taking over 
Merrill Lynch and of JPMorgan taking over Bear Stearns is consistent. 
VI. WHAT CAN BE DONE: COMMAND-AND-CONTROL VERSUS 
INCENTIVE-BASED POLICIES 
To say that we have analyzed an underexamined cost of too-big-to-fail 
finance does not mean that we can remedy the problem. But the analysis 
throws new light on policymaking paths. First, it further justifies existing 
policy initiatives to end too-big-to-fail problems. Second, it shows how the 
financial industry’s incentives to resist these initiatives might be changed. 
Third, it points to new initiatives to better stabilize finance. Fourth, it 
reveals the corporate governance consequences we should expect from 
successful regulation that diminishes the too-big-to-fail subsidy.  
The broadest and most effective policy would be to deny the large finan-
cial firms too-big-to-fail status, by regulators either making them inde-
structible or making their failure tolerable. The too-big-to-fail subsidy 
would diminish, funding costs for big finance would stabilize at standalone 
market rates, and the incentives toward corporate structural degradation 
would decline. Regulators have been making such efforts, and these efforts 
continue. 
Current banking regulation is one of the barriers to bank restructuring, 
and regulators could be more open to a change in control at a financial 
firm.61 That is, banking rules now require regulatory approval of a change in 
control of the bank,62 and many analysts see these regulations as the primary 
barrier to financial changes in control,63 because regulators are wary of 
control changes that could introduce more risk into the firm (or because 
they tend to protect industry incumbents). A new controlling shareholder 
would typically become a regulated bank holding company, thereby affecting 
 
61 Cf. Peter Wallison & Kenneth Scott, Questions About Brown–Vitter (Shadow Fin. Regulatory 
Comm. Statement No. 341, 2013), available at http://www.aei.org/files/2013/05/13/-statement-no-
341-questions-about-brownvitter_12514055289.pdf (recommending enhanced segment reporting to 
facilitate buyouts of bank holding company divisions). 
62 Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(g) (2012); Change in Bank Control 
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1817( j) (2012) (requiring notice to regulators sixty days prior to a person or entity 
taking control of a depository institution); Regulation Y of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.2(e), 225.31(d), 225.41(c) (2013) (requiring registration or notice 
upon change in “control”). 
63 See ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 53; Amar Bhidé, The Hidden Costs and Underpinnings 
of Debt Market Liquidity (Columbia Univ. Ctr. on Capitalism and Soc’y, Working Paper No. 79, 
2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2206996. 
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and restricting the activist’s other permitted business lines. (One policy 
possibility to explore would be an interim exemption, during which the 
offeror downsized the bank.) 
The analytic from this Article suggests why shareholders have not been 
pushing regulators to ease the regulatory barrier in the same way that they 
have pushed the Securities and Exchange Commission for similar kinds of 
shareholder influence in industrial firms.64 Regulatory barriers aside, profit-
oriented shareholders have not had much incentive to restructure and 
downsize the too-big-to-fail financial firm because doing so would lose the 
subsidy. Indeed, inviting shareholders to seek restructuring, without any 
other change to shareholders’ distorted incentives in financial institutions, is 
decidedly not a solution—shareholders’ incentives still do not match the 
public’s in reducing corporate degradation and financial risk. Unless the 
shareholders’ incentives change, shareholder-induced restructurings alone 
are no solution. Better policy initiatives are needed to align private incen-
tives with public goals. 
A. Severe Command-and-Control: Mimicking the Takeover and  
Breakup Market 
The corporate governance analytic here resonates with three policy 
efforts. Two are mainstays of regulatory thinking, one is not. 
One obvious mainstay is for the government to break up the big banks—
a favorite among severe antibank critics from the left and the right.65 The 
government would complete the corporate restructuring in big finance that 
the poison pill quality of the subsidy impedes. 
But a government breakup policy is unwise. The government is poorly 
suited to formulate and implement a breakup plan well. Years of litigation 
and politicking could cost more than the cure. And big finance is heteroge-
neous: Some firms will be obvious candidates for breakup (for example, 
separating Bank of America from Merrill Lynch, or Citigroup overall), in 
that they would never have arrived at, nor could they survive at, their scale 
 
64 See, e.g., Submission from the Council of Institutional Investors to the U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n on SEC Release Nos. 33-9086, 34-61161 (Aug. 3, 2010) (SEC File No. S7-10-09). 
65 Compare William Greider, Bank-Buster Brown, NATION, April 1, 2013, at 8 (explaining that 
Senator Sherrod Brown seeks the breakup of the largest U.S. financial service companies), with 
Fisher & Rosenblum, supra note 59; Boyd & Heitz, supra note 33, at 1 (indicating that “the 
potential benefits to economies of scale are unlikely to ever exceed the potential costs due to 
increased risk of financial crisis”); and James Pethokoukis, Too Big to Fail Is Too Good to Resist, 
NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/343804/too-big-fail-
too-good-resist-james-pethokoukis (noting that the Senate voted 99-0 against “too-big-to-fail” 
subsidies). 
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and scope without the too-big-to-fail subsidy. But once decisions become 
more nuanced, the government will be ill-suited to reconstruct the financial 
industry because some too-big-to-fail financial firms may be efficiently sized 
and the government could not precisely sort out the efficient from the 
inefficient. 
Moreover, the private value of the constituent firms when broken apart 
would be less than their value in the financial conglomerate with the 
subsidy. The government officials who engineered the breakup would have 
destroyed private value and would struggle to show why that loss of finan-
cial firm value was socially worthwhile. That the lost subsidy was not a loss 
to the economy would be hard to explain. 
B. Mainstream Command-and-Control: More Equity, Restricted Activities 
One prime policy response to the financial crisis from regulators and 
analysts has been to require increased bank equity.66 American regulators 
are pushing up bank capital and lowering debt.67 If the once-subsidized bank 
were made to have enough equity such that it could not fail, then the too-
big-to-fail subsidy would be eliminated and normal corporate governance 
pressures and incentives would be back in play. 
Activity restrictions have also long been a mainstay of financial regula-
tion. Restricting the big banks’ riskiest activities appropriately would lower 
their probability of failure and, hence, reduce the too-big-to-fail subsidy. 
The analysis here suggests why such efforts are important. But it also 
suggests why they may not succeed: not only will regulators have to grapple 
with setting the optimal debt–equity ratio, but the incentives inside the 
firms will be to defeat, elude, and override the equity increases, to get too-
big-to-fail subsidies back into the firm, and to find ways around limits to risky 
activities if the rules are promulgated despite the opposition. Financial firms 
reacted to the Brown–Vitter 15% capital proposal quickly and negatively.68 
 
66 See, e.g., ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 53; Hal S. Scott, The Reduction of Systemic Risk 
in the United States Financial System, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 671, 679-85 (2010); Michael R. 
Crittenden & Victoria McGrane, Fed Officials Back Higher Capital, WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 2013, at C3. 
67 See Michael R. Crittenden, Plan Reins in Biggest Banks: Proposal Requiring Extra Capital 
Would Force Firms to Be More Conservative or Shrink, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2013, at A1. 
68 See DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, BROWN–VITTER BILL: COMMENTARY AND 
ANALYSIS (2013), available at http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/files/Publication/ 
4664ec91-6233-48ed-8645-00db44eeb9fe/Preview/PublicationAttachment/b9d7cae5-07e9-4ccb-8884- 
011abbf0b823/043013_Brown_Vitter_Commentary_Analysis.pdf (criticizing the bill); Terminating 
Bailouts for Taxpayer Fairness Act of 2013, S. 798, 111th Cong. (declaring that the purpose of the 
act is “[t]o address equity capital requirements for financial institutions”); Jesse Eisinger, In 
Brown–Vitter Bill, a Bank Overhaul with Possible Teeth, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2013, at B4. 
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And, when regulators announced tougher capital rules in July 2013, the 
media reported that the firms were already finding ways to avoid the rule’s 
impact.69 If regulators could simultaneously realign financial firms’ incen-
tives—not easy, to be sure—they might do better with the regulation now 
on the table.  
C. Aligning Incentives: Taxing Financial Firms’ Debt  
Lastly, we briefly examine a new potential policy effort, one emanating 
from the incentive and corporate governance degradation thus far analyzed. 
Consider how we now tax banks: the tax structure subsidizes bank debt 
and punishes bank equity. This can be changed. 
First off, and conventionally, equity is taxed unfavorably compared to 
debt: interest on the firm’s debt is deductible from the tax bill, but dividend 
payments and returns on equity generally are not.  
Although this is standard knowledge applicable to both financial and 
industrial firms,70 the distortive impact is greater for financial firms. Be-
cause financial firms are more heavily leveraged than industrial firms, their 
debt-to-equity taxation imbalance is more severe. Debt amounts to more 
than 90% of the average financial firm’s capital structure, while it comes to 
less than 50% for nonfinancial firms. And the government subsidizes debt 
twice for financial firms: they first obtain the standard tax deduction for 
interest, which, given their leveraged capital structure, is very high; they are 
then subsidized again with the too-big-to-fail subsidy.  
Notice the regulatory contradiction and the distorted incentives. Regula-
tors properly instruct financial firms that they must hold more equity. Then 
the government taxes profits on that equity, but reduces those taxes if the 
financial firm pays a return to its funds providers in the form of interest, 
incentivizing the firm to do the opposite of the get-more-equity regulatory 
command. And finally, via the too-big-to-fail subsidy, we further facilitate 
financial firms to use more debt and less equity. These debt-based incentives 
give financial firms strong reason to defeat regulators’ equity requirements 
in multiple forums: first in lobbying, then in transactional workarounds. 
Current equity-increasing regulation may not work well if the twin debt 
subsidies stay in place. Equity regulation is a command-and-control effort 
 
69 See Tom Braithwaite, Tracy Alloway & Dan McCrum, US Banks to Shuffle Assets over Lev-
erage Rules, FIN. TIMES, July 10, 2013 (noting evasion methods such as shuffling assets between 
subsidiaries). 
70 Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A 
Correction, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 433, 434 (1963); RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS 
& FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 472-90 (9th ed. 2007). 
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that runs into a wall of the financial firms’ high incentives to defeat the 
regulation. To make it work, we should point regulatory and tax policy in 
the same direction: instead of taxing the corporate financial entity based on 
its profitability, which discourages it from using more equity, the govern-
ment should tax the financial firm on its level of debt, which would instead 
encourage it to decrease debt and increase equity.71 
If tax policy no longer subsidized debt and taxed equity, large financial 
firms would have more reason to adopt systemically sound capital structures 
and to incentivize executives accordingly, and they would do so even 
without being hounded by the regulators to increase their capital levels.  
*      *      * 
 This tax change would not be problem-free. As with any tax, the parties 
will game it—some financial operations will move into the financial firm if 
taxed less there, and vice versa. Tax avoidance would arise. Debts would be 
hidden; characterization of transactions as debt would be contested.  
But by raising the tax on debt levels, financial firms would find debt 
more costly than before. JPMorgan Chase, for example, most recently paid 
about $6 billion in annual income tax on its approximately $20 billion of 
profit.72 That tax made equity less attractive to JPMorgan, its shareholders, 
its board, and its senior executives. A reverse tax structure of taxing debt, 
not equity, would leave shareholders, boards, and senior managers with less 
reason to use so much debt. Incentives would work in tandem with command-
and-control rules. Regulation by instruction should therefore be buttressed 
with regulation of incentives. 
  
VII. THE STRUCTURAL OUTLOOK FOR BIG FINANCE WITHOUT A 
TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL SUBSIDY 
A. Reducing the Systemic Cost of Shareholder-Oriented Governance 
One might mistakenly think that the thesis here grates against important 
findings that shareholder-oriented corporate governance was detrimental to 
financial stability during the financial crisis. But it does not.  
 
71 Hilary J. Allen, Let’s Talk About Tax: Fixing Bank Incentives to Sabotage Stability, 18 FORDHAM 
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 821 (2013); Mark Roe & Michael Tröge, How to Use a Bank Tax to Make the 
Financial System Safer, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2014, at 9. 
72 JPMorgan Chase & Co., Annual Report, supra note 5. 
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The basis for questioning the value of shareholder-oriented financial 
firm governance is straightforward: as long as there is a strong too-big-to-
fail subsidy, shareholder interests will find it profitable to take heavy risk, 
because a significant fraction of the downside is borne by the government or 
by the overall economy, not by the firm and its shareholders. Financial firms 
that were more shareholder-oriented,73 firms that had managers compen-
sated more with equity than with debt-like obligations,74 and banks in 
countries that favored shareholder governance all did worse in the financial 
crisis than their opposites. 
All this is true. But these are reasons why the incentives-based corporate 
governance analytic is needed. Shareholder-oriented corporate governance 
today degrades financial firms because the too-big-to-fail subsidy distorts 
corporate governance incentives. If we reduced or eliminated that distor-
tion, then shareholder corporate governance could work better than it does 
now. Today, shareholder-oriented American financial firms have strong 
private incentives to maintain thin equity layers that offload risk to the 
authorities and to the financial system. And, in doing so, the result is to 
build unwieldy, misshapen corporate structures. What we should want is to 
straighten out those incentives by taking away the too-big-to-fail subsidy, 
or—if we cannot eliminate the subsidy directly—to find a way to offset it, so 
that incentives inside the big firms change for the better. 
B. The Instability of the Too-Big-to-Fail Subsidy 
The size of a too-big-to-fail subsidy is constantly in flux. Regulation gets 
better or worse. Financial transactions change. The economy improves or 
degrades, making failure more or less likely. Bank defenders contend that 
the subsidy has disappeared—or at least is disappearing—or that the big 
increase in the too-big-to-fail subsidy detected during and after the financial 
crisis will subside as the economy stabilizes, as financiers learn from mistakes, 
 
73 See Andrea Beltratti & René M. Stulz, The Credit Crisis Around the Globe: Why Did Some 
Banks Perform Better? 105 J. FIN. ECON. 1 (2012); Daniel Ferreira, David Kershaw, Tom Kirch-
maier & Edmund Schuster, Shareholder Empowerment and Bank Bailouts (ECGI Fin., Working 
Paper No. 345/2013, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2170392 (explaining that insulation 
from shareholders correlated with better bank performance during the economic crisis); Chris-
tophe Moussu & Arthur Petit-Romec, ROE in Banks: Myth and Reality (May 2013) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2374068 (discussing how bankers’ return-on-
equity correlated with the “excessive risk-taking” that had a role in the crisis). 
74 See Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & René M. Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis, 99 J. 
FIN. ECON. 11 (2011) (exploring the connection between shareholder-focused CEO incentives and 
the credit crisis); Sugato Bhattacharyya & Amiyatosh K. Purnanandam, Risk-Taking by Banks: 
What Did We Know and When Did We Know It? (Nov. 18, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1619472. 
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and as regulators reconstruct the rules. This possibility of a declining 
subsidy leads to two reactions: one of cautious skepticism, which I outline 
next, and another of the transactional consequences, which are quite sub-
stantial, if and when the subsidy disappears. 
First, some skepticism. Big picture pressures can too quickly induce a 
policy consensus that the too-big-to-fail problem has been resolved. The 
interests of the regulated in minimizing the too-big-to-fail problem are 
obvious and need not be detailed. And regulators also have reason to move 
on. They are working to implement new legislation, promulgate new 
regulation, or bring new vigor in applying longstanding principles. To 
acknowledge that the too-big-to-fail problem today is—six years after the 
start of the financial crisis—not yet substantially under control would be to 
admit that their actions were insufficient, poorly constructed, or poorly 
executed. Moreover, a regulatory system can only be on high alert for so 
long.75  
A strong economy makes financial failure less likely than a weak economy. 
Even if policies and firms’ operational risks stay constant, too-big-to-fail 
benefits rise and fall with the economy because in a healthy economy, unlike 
in a weak economy, firms are less likely to fail. Policymakers and opinion-
makers may readily confuse an improved economy—and it usually does 
improve after a crisis—for a permanent fix to, rather than a real but tempo-
rary respite from, the too-big-to-fail problem. The data suggest a big boost 
in the subsidy during the crisis,76 which may be declining,77 but the data also 
point to lower but longstanding, substantial subsidy levels outside of the 
crisis.78 
Pre-Dodd-Frank regulatory opinion shows how easy it is to consider the 
financial mission accomplished. Failures, like that of Continental Illinois 
and Long-Term Capital Management, induced regulators to reassess failure 
possibilities that had seemed remote and unlikely.79 Reforms ensued. But 
 
75 Anjan V. Thakor, The Financial Crisis of 2007–09: Why Did It Happen and What Did 
We Learn? ( Jan. 7, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2372449. 
76 See infra Table 1. 
77 MOODY’S CONCLUDES REVIEW, supra note 23. But cf. Peter Eavis, Moody’s Threatens to 
Cut Credit Ratings of Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2013, at B3 (“Paul Volcker, a former chairman of 
the Federal Reserve, expressed skepticism about Dodd-Frank’s wind-down approach. ‘No one in 
the market believes it,’ he said.”). 
78 Cf. Jesse Hamilton, Bernanke Says Too-Big-to-Fail Banks May Face New Capital Demands, 
BLOOMBERG ( July 18, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-18/bernanke-says-too-
big-to-fail-banks-may-face-new-capital-demands.html. 
79 PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND 
THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (Apr. 1999); Frederic S. Mishkin, 
How Big a Problem Is Too Big to Fail?, 44 J. ECON. LITERATURE 988, 991-92 (2006) (skeptically 
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consider this analytic, just before the financial crisis broke in 2007, from a 
former Federal Reserve Board governor in a prominent essay: “The evi-
dence does not support a worsening of the too-big-to-fail problem . . . [but 
rather a] substantial improvement on this score.”80 New legislation and 
better banking regulation had induced “a sea-change in the industry,” 
resulting in more bank capital and better bank risk management as the Basel 
Accords took effect.81 Moreover, market yields showed no excessively large 
too-big-to-fail bounce in long-term bank bonds, as there once had been,82 
and relative yields between large (too-big-to-fail) banks and small banks 
narrowed or disappeared. This view was unexceptional at the time among 
the financial cognoscenti,83 including regulators.84 Yet it was a view ex-
pressed as late as 2006—just before the financial crisis and the failures of 
AIG, Bear Stearns, and Lehman Brothers. 
*      *      * 
Nonetheless, the too-big-to-fail feature of American finance is a variable, 
not a constant, with its likelihood and its extent rising and falling, expanding 
and contracting, from one geographic region and financial sector to another, 
and from small institutions to large ones and, perhaps, back again. 
Thus, for those who are skeptical about the continuing importance of 
the too-big-to-fail subsidy after Dodd-Frank, this Article analyzes what the 
corporate governance of the big banks would have looked like if too-big-to-fail 
 
reviewing GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF 
BANK BAILOUTS (2004)). 
80 Id. at 996. 
81 Id. at 997 (noting that by 2004, the largest banks more than doubled their capital ratios 
and maintained at least as much capital as smaller banks, possibly reflecting a perception that large 
banks were less likely to be bailed out). The 1998 Basel Accord standardized bank capital 
requirements internationally and has been praised for increasing focus on risk. Id. at 996. 
82 Id. at 996-98 (noting that bond yields, which reflect a bank’s actual riskiness, and narrowing 
rate differences suggest that the too-big-to-fail problem “is not as bad as it once was”). 
83 A well-respected British banking regulator opined then that “reducing the possibility of 
the disruptive failure of a [large and complex financial institution] is a central preoccupation of 
public policy. The good news is that the likelihood of such an eventuality is remote.” Andrew 
Crockett, Dealing with Stress at Large and Complex Financial Institutions, in SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL 
CRISES 17, 18 (Douglas D. Evanoff & George G. Kaufman eds., 2005). 
84 Larry D. Wall, Too Big to Fail After FDICIA, FED. RES. BANK ATLANTA ECON. REV., 
no. 1, 2010, at 1, 10 (“The net effect of FDICIA should be to reduce interbank risk substantially. 
The prompt corrective action provisions and the increase in market discipline . . . constrain bank 
risk taking . . . . [T]hese factors should almost eliminate the risk that one bank’s failure would cause 
insolvency at other banks.” (emphasis added)). 
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had not been cured. For optimists, the analysis provides added reason to be 
thankful that the problem is under control. 
C. The Dealmaking Impact of Successful Regulation 
We have considered here the corporate governance impact of the too-
big-to-fail subsidy in causing misshapen, too-large organizations that lack 
basic incentives to restructure. The subsidy acts like a traditional poison pill, 
deterring outsiders and insiders from improving the organization’s struc-
ture. We have also seen that the too-big-to-fail subsidy has been large and 
increased sharply during the financial crisis. 
 Industry players have begun to proclaim that the regulators have already 
succeeded and, even if not, they will in due course. Some regulators are 
signing on. “Treasury Secretary Jack Lew is arguing that the battle against 
too-big-to-fail financial institutions is largely won.”85 The ratings agencies are 
also coming around to that view.86 But the most recent academic and regula-
tory data, although showing soundness improving, indicate that too-big-to-fail 
is still real.87 And the IMF’s recent comprehensive measure of the too-big-
to-fail subsidy in the United States concludes that the subsidy had narrowed 
from its financial crisis high, but was even in 2013 still at about 15 basis 
points for bank debt, making “the expected value of government guarantees 
 
85 Neil Irwin, Did Dodd-Frank End Too Big to Fail?, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Dec. 6, 
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/12/06/did-dodd-frank-end-too-big-
to-fail-it-depends-what-you-mean-by-end; see also Michael R. Crittenden, Treasury’s Lew: Dodd-
Frank Law Ended ‘Too Big to Fail,’ WALL ST. J. ( July 17, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-
CO-20130717-705169.html. For skepticism, see Jesse Eisinger, Soothing Words on ‘Too Big to Fail,’ 
but with Little Meaning, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2013, at B5; and Simon Johnson, Celebrations of Too 
Big to Fail’s Demise Are Premature, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 8, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
print/2013-12-08/celebrations-of-too-big-to-fail-s-demise-are-premature.html. For regulatory skepticism, 
see the FDIC’s vice chair’s view: “Hoenig said the authority . . . in the Dodd-Frank Act to 
dismantle a large bank may be effective only in an ‘idiosyncratic’ situation and not a wider 
breakdown. In the latter case, lawmakers may be pressured to weigh a bailout . . . .” Jesse 
Hamilton, FDIC’s Hoenig Says Another Crisis May Resurrect Bailout Specter, BLOOMBERG ( June 26, 
2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-26/fdic-s-hoenig-says-another-crisis-may-resurrect-
bailout-specter.html. 
86 See Eavis, supra note 77 (stating that there is a belief “that the government is now more 
likely to let large banks fail in a crisis”). 
87 See Alexander Schäfer, Isabel Schnabel & Beatrice Weder di Mauro, Financial Sector Reform 
After the Crisis: Has Anything Happened? (CEPR, Discussion Paper Series No. 9502, May 24, 2013), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2274044, whose event studies around the time the Volcker 
Rule (which limited bank derivatives trading) moved forward showed lowered expectations of a 
bailout. But, they say, one can “compare our [new] results [with prior results, including] Ueda and 
Weder di Mauro[, supra note 31, which concluded] the value of the subsidy as of 2009 was as much 
as 60 to 80 basis points funding costs differential. Measured against this benchmark, we would 
conclude that none of the national reforms has been enough to fully eliminate the distortion.” Id. at 23. 
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for a distressed [major bank somewhat] higher than [our estimate of ] its 
precrisis level.”88 Optimists figuratively draw a trend-line—the too-big-to-
fail problem is diminishing and will be fully under control soon. The 
pessimists (realists?) see the current improvements as likely to be the 
postcrisis high-water mark, with safety degradation likely to begin as the 
crisis-induced alert mind-set becomes less intense. 
But what are the structural implications if the optimists and industry 
defenders are right? 
If the too-big-to-fail subsidy disappears, then corporate restructurings in 
big finance that were once not viable should become profitable. Pressures to 
reverse the increase in the biggest financial firms’ size should rise. 
Misshapen financial firms’ distortions will become more obvious, and 
their costs will no longer be largely or fully offset by the subsidy. As that 
happens, internal incentives of boards and senior managers will change, and 
activists would be able to enter the arena to push to restructure the distorted 
financial firms.89 If the too-big-to-fail subsidy is seen to have sharply 
declined, we should see more divestitures and breakups. 
While the financial industry and some regulators are increasingly happy 
to announce that the too-big-to-fail problem has been beaten—just as 
several had announced before the financial crisis—the dealmaking, activist 
environment is not yet consistent. Although some restructuring has occurred,90 
the mega-banks have not yet been heavily involved, and even shareholder 
activism is minor: “Although the 2012 and 2013 proxy seasons saw in-
creased . . . shareholder activism across a range of industries, that trend has 
not yet made its way to the U.S. banking industry.”91 If the too-big-to-fail 
subsidy is gone—or if it goes soon—the dealmaking environment in the 
financial sector should change. 
 
88 Int’l Monetary Fund, supra note 32, at 104, 114. 
89 Large financial firms do sometimes divest. See, e.g., Peter Lattman, JPMorgan to Spin Out 
Its Private Equity Unit, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK ( June 14, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2013/06/14/jpmorgan-to-spin-out-its-private-equity-unit; Steven Marlin, Citigroup Sells Travelers Unit 
to MetLife for $11.5 Billion, BANK SYSTEMS & TECH. ( Jan. 31, 2005), http://www.banktech.com/ 
citigroup-sells-travelers-unit-to-metlif/59300242.  
90 See, e.g., Robert Barba, Divestitures on Rise in M&A as Banks Decide Less Is More, AM. 
BANKER (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_184/divestitures-on-rise-in-m-
and-a-as-banks-decide-less-is-more-1062352-1.html; Lattman, supra note 89; Marlin, supra note 89.  
91 William Sweet, Shareholder Activism in the US Banking Industry, HARVARD L. SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 3, 2013), https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/ 
2013/12/03/shareholder-activism-in-the-us-banking-industry. 
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CONCLUSION 
JPMorgan Chase’s $6 billion trading loss highlighted organizational fra-
gility at the country’s too-big-to-fail banks and helped us understand 
corporate governance degradation in big finance.  
Defenders of the bank, its CEO, and its senior managers saw JPMor-
gan’s loss as massive and regrettable, but well within the bank’s earnings, its 
huge equity capital, and its more-than-trillion-dollar asset base. Hence, the 
problem, they claimed, was one for the bank’s shareholders, its managers, 
and its board—not one for extended regulatory concern. Public funds were 
never at risk. 
But the proper analysis of JPMorgan’s London Whale trades differs. 
Shareholder-based corporate governance will not work when there is a large 
too-big-to-fail subsidy. Shareholder activists who would break up a less-
than-well-run bank, or divisional heads who would seek to buy out an 
orphaned division, would find themselves handicapped in the breakup or 
buyout. Not only would they have to make the efficiencies and restructuring 
work—which is hard enough—but they would lose the too-big-to-fail 
subsidy. The broken-up or spun-off entity would no longer be too-big-to-fail 
and its cost of funding would rise. Activist shareholders would have to 
overcome a high hurdle, one akin to a corporate transactor’s poison pill.  
Firms grow too large for multiple reasons. Managerial error in projecting 
economies of scale that turn out to be evanescent is one of the most benign. 
Random variation is another. Managerial empire-building is also common, 
and a third. The push from the too-big-to-fail subsidy is a powerful fourth. 
Whatever the reason for the excessive growth, normal corporate structural 
pushback is absent or degraded in the too-big-to-fail financial firm. Boards 
that might second-guess expansion have less reason to doubt its profitability 
when that expansion is financed with the boost from a too-big-to-fail 
subsidy. They need not even be aware of the subsidy; they only need to 
notice its effects—that funding costs are lower—and attribute their good 
fortune to their own perspicacity. 
Measures of the too-big-to-fail subsidy are typically cast as discounts on 
the banks’ borrowing rate, with the discount less than 1% per annum. This 
number may seem small. But that small number can amount to a noticeable 
fraction of shareholder profits—about one-third in multiple postcrisis 
studies. That is not a small number. Losing one-third of the profit of the 
financial firm would be a serious setback. Since the sharpest tools for 
corporate governance must cut through this large profit loss before reaching 
corporate operations, the sharpest tools for corporate governance are 
blunted or broken in the large, too-big-to-fail financial firm. 
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This destruction of the sharpest tools of corporate governance burdens 
the economy, revealing a major cost of too-big-to-fail banking: the degrada-
tion of financial firm efficiency even without an actual bailout. The core 
financial firms are run less well due to the subsidy and are more likely to fail. 
 The analytics here are an added rationale for the current regulatory 
efforts to increase bank capital, restrict risky activities, and make financial 
firm failure possible. The analytics also point to how to make the current 
regulatory forays more effective. Instead of relying overwhelmingly on 
command-and-control regulation that financial firms have large incentives 
to resist, reverse, and sidestep, policymakers should now also focus on the 
internal corporate governance organizational incentives. They can, and they 
should, make the financial firm’s debt more expensive for its managers, board, 
and shareholders, while making equity less expensive. Command-and-control 
orders to increase financial capital and reduce risky activities are properly 
the first regulatory responses, but regulatory styles have diminishing marginal 
returns just like other economic activities. The corporate governance 
analysis here shows how and why another policy channel based on organiza-
tional incentives could be opened. It is not on the current policy agenda, but 
it needs to get there. 
Regardless of whether we can cure the problem, I have analyzed here in 
depth how the too-big-to-fail subsidy degrades the standard, core corporate 
structural tools—from the sharpest tool of the takeover, to the incentives for 
spinoffs, to the incentives for well-directed shareholder structural initia-
tives. The corporate governance tools that help to right-size, stabilize, and 
make efficient industrial firms, crude and imperfect though they might be, 
all weaken or disappear in large-scale American finance.  
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APPENDIX 
Table 1: Too-Big-to-Fail Capital Cost Saving Changes During the Financial  
Crisis, Recalibrated as a Portion of Profits 
 
Study 
Implied 
Equity 
Subsidy 
Baseline 
Result 
Sample Baseline Data 
Postcrisis 
Period 
Precrisis 
Period 
Dean Baker & 
Travis McArthur, 
The Value of the 
“Too Big to Fail” 
Big Bank Subsidy 
26% 
9 to 49 
bps 
increase in 
funding 
costs 
Institutions 
with greater 
than $100 
billion in 
assets in 
March 2009 
Average 
quarterly cost 
of funds 
Q4, 2008 to 
Q2, 2009 
High case: 
Q1, 2001 to 
Q4, 2007; 
Low case: 
Q4, 2001 to 
Q2, 2002 
Kenichi Ueda & 
Beatrice Weder di 
Mauro, 
Quantifying 
Structural Subsidy 
Values for 
Systemically 
Important 
Financial 
Institutions 
18% 
20 bps 
increase 
from end 
of 2007 to 
end of 
2009 
All banks 
with Fitch 
support 
ratings 
(including 
international) 
Ratings 
support 
End of 2009 
End of 
2007 
Frederic A. 
Schweikhard & 
Zoe Tsesmelidakis, 
The Impact of 
Government 
Interventions on 
CDS and Equity 
Markets 
53% 
60 bps 
increase in 
abnormal 
CDS 
spread 
Financial 
institutions 
with CDS 
Credit 
default swap 
(CDS) data 
2007 to 2010 Precrisis 
Zan Li, Shisheng 
Qu & Jing Zhang, 
Quantifying the 
Value of Implicit 
Government 
Guarantees for 
Large Financial 
Institutions 
(Moody’s Report) 
29% 
33 bps 
increase in 
difference 
between 
CDS 
spreads of 
large and 
small 
banks 
Top 20 banks 
by assets in 
2007, 
compared to 
small banks 
CDS and 
Moody’s 
Expected 
Default 
Frequency / 
fair-value 
CDS spreads 
Postcrisis 
2001 to 
2010 
Viral V. Acharya, 
Deniz Anginer & 
A. Joseph 
Warburton, The 
End of Market 
Discipline? 
Investor 
Expectations of 
Implicit State 
Guarantees 
41% 
56 bps 
increase in 
funding 
cost 
advantage 
Top 10% (by 
size) of SIC 
codes of 60-
64 with U.S.-
issued bonds 
Bond pricing 
data from 
three separate 
databases 
1990 to 2010 
2007 to 
2009 
Average Range 
Change 
33.3%      
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In Table 1, we take the measured funding benefit increase from before to after the finan-
cial crisis in each study and convert that benefit to a percentage of profits for Baker & 
McArthur’s sample of 18 large financial institutions. (Citations to Baker & McArthur and the 
other cited items can be found in Section III.B’s footnotes.) So as not to rely on the results 
of any single, potentially atypical, year, profits for 2006, 2009, and 2012 are used. The 
calculations assume the 18 institutions to have a capital structure that has 10% equity and 90% 
debt. For calculating the extent of the subsidy to debt, we reduced this first debt number by 
the approximate level of insured deposits in the large bank liability structure (about 25%). 
The result both overestimates and underestimates the subsidy. It overestimates it because we 
apply it to all debt of the entity, not just the debt whose subsidy effect is being measured. 
(Not all debt may be perceived as equally likely to be government-protected as the debt 
studied.) The result also underestimates the subsidy, because the too-big-to-fail subsidy will 
boost off–balance sheet items and trading activity that do not appear on the financial 
institutions’ balance sheets. We use bank holding company assets, liabilities, and profits for 
uniformity and availability.  
Different averaging measures will lead to different results: (1) one can average the equity 
subsidy for each bank, which gives great weight in the overall average to a bank with small 
profits in one year, because the equity subsidy can amount to several multiples of low profits; 
(2) one can sum the profits for the 18 institutions in a particular year and divide this by the 
total equity subsidy for all 18 banks in that year, thereby reducing the potential for one low-
profit institution to skew the results upward (and thereby can include banks with losses, 
while method (1) cannot meaningfully include observations of banks with losses); (3) one can 
check that the results are similar for the six largest financial institutions that usually are 
viewed as too-big-to-fail; and (4) one can use methods (1)–(3), but with a different year’s 
profits. The table presents method (2), using 2006, 2009, and 2012 profit levels. In the 
unpublished appendix, we calculated the results for methods (1), (3), and (4) (using 2012 
profits). The results were approximately the same size. 
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Table 2: Measured levels of too-big-to-fail funding cost savings  
recalibrated as a portion of profits 
 
 
Study 
Implied 
Equity 
Subsidy 
Baseline 
Result 
Sample Baseline Data 
Time 
Period 
Dean Baker & Travis 
McArthur, The Value 
of the “Too Big to 
Fail” Big Bank 
Subsidy 
75% 
78 bps 
difference in 
funding costs 
between 
small and 
large banks 
Institutions 
with greater 
than $100 billion 
in assets, 
compared to 
those with less 
Average quarterly 
cost of funds, 
provided by the 
FDIC 
Q4, 
2008 to 
Q2, 
2009 
Kenichi Ueda & 
Beatrice Weder di 
Mauro, Quantifying 
Structural Subsidy 
Values for Systemi-
cally Important 
Financial Institu-
tions 
77% 
80 bps 
postcrisis 
funding 
advantage for 
large banks 
All banks with 
Fitch support 
ratings 
(including 
international) 
Credit ratings 
(overall, and with 
and without 
support from 
government of 
from parent banks) 
End of 
2009 
Viral V. Acharya, 
Deniz Anginer & A. 
Joseph Warburton, 
The End of Market 
Discipline? Investor 
Expectations of 
Implicit State 
Guarantees 
23% 
Funding 
advantage 
averages 28 
bps, peaking 
at 120 bps in 
2009 
Top 10% (by 
size) of SIC 
codes of 60-64 
with U.S.-
issued bonds 
Bond pricing data 
from three separate 
databases 
1990 to 
2010 
Priyank Gandhi & 
Hanno Lustig, Size 
Anomalies in U.S. 
Bank Stock Returns 
37% 
Subsidy for 
large banks 
averaging 
3.1% of 
market 
capitalization 
U.S. incorpo-
rated commer-
cial banks, 
nondepository 
credit 
institutions, and 
investment 
banks 
Differences in risk-
adjusted returns in 
bank stocks 
1970 to 
2009 
Elijah Brewer III & 
Jalupa Jagtiani, How 
Much Did Banks Pay 
to Become Too-Big-
to-Fail and to 
Become Systemically 
Important? 
36% 
36% 
premium on 
acquisitions 
by acquiring 
firms 
8 merger deals 
that brought 
organizations to 
over $100 billion 
in assets 
Premerger prices 
and purchase 
prices, and asset 
sizes of target and 
acquiring firms 
1991 to 
2004 
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Stefan Jacewitz & 
Jonathan Pogach, 
Deposit Rate 
Advantages at the 
Largest Banks 
38% 
39 bps lower 
risk premium 
paid by larger 
banks 
Largest U.S. 
banks ($100 
billion in assets) 
compared to all 
other banks 
Deposit rates 
offered at the 
branch level 
Q1, 
2005 to 
Q3, 
2010 
João Santos, 
Evidence from the 
Bond Market on 
Banks’ “Too-Big-to-
Fail” Subsidy 
40% 
41 bps 
average 
funding 
advantage 
over bonds of 
all types 
U.S. banks, 
nonbanks, and 
nonfinancial 
corporations 
Bond pricing 
between large and 
small banks, 
compared to 
nonbanks and 
nonfinancial 
corporations 
1985 to 
2009 
International 
Monetary Fund’s 
2014 Global 
Financial Stability 
Report 
14% 
15 bps 
postcrisis 
funding 
advantage for 
largest U.S. 
banks 
U.S. systemical-
ly important 
banks as defined 
by the Financial 
Stability Board 
(1) Difference 
between fair value 
and observed CDS 
spreads, and (2) 
estimated rating 
uplift from 
government 
2013 
Average 43%     
 
In Table 2, we take the measured funding benefit in each study and convert that funding 
benefit to a percentage of profits. We used the same method as for Table 1, aggregating 
studies that estimated the pre- to postcrisis increase in the too-big-to-fail funding subsidy.  
 
